Optimal Tariffs when the Trade Elasticity Varies by Ara Tomohiro

























Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Fukushima University 


















Discussion Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form and are circulated for discussion 
and comment purposes. Therefore, Discussion Papers cannot be reproduced or distributed without 
the written consent of the authors. 





We show that the variable nature of the trade elasticity provides new policy implications of optimal
tariffs. Conditional on the two sufficient statistics for welfare, the optimal level of import tariffs is the same
across different trade models with a constant trade elasticity, but more generally it depends on the micro
structure that makes the trade elasticity variable. Using analytical solutions of comparative statics with
respect to trade liberalization and country size, we also quantitatively compare the difference in bilateral
and unilateral impacts of these competitive pressures on optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity.
Keywords: Optimal tariffs, variable trade elasticity, trade liberalization, country size.
JEL Classification Numbers: F12, F13, F16
∗This study is conducted as a part of the Project “Economic Policy Issues in the Global Economy” undertaken at the Research
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). The author would like to thank Svetlana Demidova and Takumi Naito for
helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. Financial support from the Japan Society of the Promotion of Science
under grant numbers 19K01599, 20H01492 and 20H01498 is gratefully acknowledged. This paper circulated previously under the
title “Competition, Productivity, and Trade, Reconsidered.”
†Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Fukushima University, Fukushima 960-1296, Japan. Email address:
tomohiro.ara@gmail.com
1 Introduction
A growing body of empirical evidence using aggregate and firm-level data has demonstrated that country size
has a critical impact on the domestic trade share, one of the sufficient statistics for welfare along with the
trade elasticity (Arkolakis et al., 2012). For example, using aggregate data on manufacturing for 25 countries,
Eaton and Kortum (2002, 2011) show that larger countries tend to buy much more products from the domestic
market than smaller countries. Using firm-level data on manufacturing, Bernard et al. (2007) and Mayer and
Ottaviano (2008) show a similar trend in the United States and European countries respectively in the sense
that larger countries tend to have a larger fraction of firms that sell their products for the domestic market
than smaller countries. These pieces of evidence indicate that country size and trade liberalization can have an
opposite effect on the domestic trade share (i.e., the share is higher, the larger and the less open are countries),
even though both factors are associated with the major source of competitive pressures on operating firms in
the domestic market.
In this paper, we explore the mechanism through which country size and trade liberalization work differently
on firm selection into exporting and address quantitative relevance of these competitive pressures for optimal
trade policy in recent trade models with imperfect competition and heterogeneous firms. As is standard in the
literature, we employ an asymmetric-country version of the Melitz (2003) model with monopolistic competition
and CES preferences. One of the well-known drawbacks in this framework is that firms’ markups are constant
which implies under firm heterogeneity that country size has no selection effects. To achieve our goal mentioned
above, we make three key departures from the existing models. First, we develop a heterogeneous firm model
without imposing specific parameterizations to a productivity distribution. Second, we exclude a freely traded
outside good sector, which makes the factoral terms-of-trade (i.e., the wage) endogenous. Finally, we analyze
not only iceberg trade costs but also import tariffs that raise government revenue. These distinctions jointly
help understand the role of two competitive pressures in generating different effects in a single unified setting,
allowing us to quantitatively measure the impact of these pressures on optimal trade policy.
Our starting point is to notice that not only does trade liberalization but also country size affects the wage.
Figure 1 displays the transition in population and GDP per capita during 1960-2020, which are regarded as a
measure of country size and the wage respectively.1 Panel A illustrates the case of the United States, displaying
a clear monotone relationship between population and GDP per capita. On the other hand, Panel B illustrates
the case of Japan where population is gradually declining due mainly to the low birthrate. According to the
Cabinet Office of Japan, population is expected to decrease from 124 million in 2020 to 97 million in 2050 and
to 86 million in 2060. It is often said that gradient shrinking in its domestic market size together with heavy
reliance on overseas demand could force Japan to see a steep decline in GDP per capita (Nikkei Asia, 2019).
Further, since changes in the wage imply changes in production costs for firms, such changes could alter firms’
behavior. For example, using micro-level datasets in Japanese manufacturing, Fukao et al. (2008) explore how
productivity differences among establishments affect establishments’ turnover during 1990-2003, the recession
period known as the “lost decade.” They find that the turnover rate is significantly higher for less productive
establishments, but nearly a half of top 10 percent of most productive establishments simultaneously exit. This
puzzling fact can be explained by the increasing wage in Japan in this period, which leads these productive
establishments to seek for relatively cheaper labor in foreign markets such as China. In this way, country size
gives rise to the shift in trade patterns that can be thought of as business destruction in an expanding country
(Bertoletti and Etro, 2017).
1While county size is measured by population here, it is measured by labor force in the quantitative exercise in a later section.
Either interpretation of country size is isomorphic for the main result of the paper.
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Figure 1 – Population and GDP per capita during 1960-2020
Source: World Bank Data.
Note: The left (right) scale measures population in units of million (GDP per capita in units of thousand US dollar).
Building on this observation, we first show that while unilateral trade liberalization entails selection effects,
unilateral market expansion entails anti-selection effects in a country of origin. Unilateral reductions in trade
costs lower firms’ expected profits by inviting more intense competition, which directly induce less firms to
enter a liberalizing country. With the endogenous wage, such reductions also worsen the factoral terms-of-trade
(i.e., decrease the relative wage). This improves profitability by decreasing production costs and raises firms’
expected profits, which indirectly induce more firms to enter a liberalizing country. In equilibrium, the indirect
effect outweighs the direct effect, and hence unilateral trade liberalization entails selection effects in a country
of origin, raising the domestic productivity cutoff at which the least inefficient firm can survive. In contrast,
unilateral increases in country size do not directly affect firms’ expected profits in an expanding country due to
exogenously fixed firms’ markups in CES preferences. Such increases only improve the factoral terms-of-trade
(i.e., increase the relative wage) as demonstrated by Krugman (1980). This worsens profitability by increasing
production costs, which makes it possible for inefficient firms to survive in an expanding country. Because of
this endogenous impact of country size on the wage, unilateral market expansion entails anti-selection effects
in a country of origin, decreasing the domestic productivity cutoff.
The effect of country size on selection contradicts that in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). The reason stems
from an outside good sector incorporated into their model in addition to a differentiated good sector, as shown
by Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013) for trade costs, and the same holds for country size. With an outside
good, the difference in country size allows for a home market effect on trade patterns by muting the factoral
terms-of-trade. This induces more firms to enter different sectors, so that a larger (smaller) country specializes
in a differentiated (outside) good. Without an outside good like the present paper, in contrast, country size
does not allow for the home market effect in trade patterns through endogenous changes in the wage. Hence it
is not very surprising that our model gives a different effect of country size from Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
confirming that we have to be careful about under which conditions this popular assumption enables us to
innocuously abstract from the wage channel.2 While a larger country accommodates relatively more inefficient
firms which negatively affects welfare, it can nonetheless enjoy greater welfare gains since a negative impact
on declined productivity is dominated by a positive impact on increased product variety.
2Our setting also differs from Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in consumers’ preferences that generate constant/variable markups,
but the absence of an outside good can reverse their result even with quadratic preferences; see Demidova (2017).
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Given the different effect of unilateral trade liberalization and unilateral market expansion on firm selection,
what can we say about their policy implications? In analyzing optimal trade policy, we show that the difference
is important for the characterization of optimal tariffs, i.e., welfare-maximizing tariffs that each country would
impose without fearing retaliation. In our model, optimal tariffs in a country are inversely related to its trading
partner’s export supply elasticity, which is composed of both the domestic trade share and the trade elasticity,
as in the existing trade models. In contrast to previous work, however, trade liberalization and country size do
not always lead to higher optimal tariffs in this paper. From a policy point of view, the effect of country size
on optimal tariffs is of particular interest: a larger country does not always benefit from setting higher tariffs.
Our model shows that although a larger country can enjoy a terms-of-trade gain from tariffs as in conventional
optimal tariff theory, it accommodates more inefficient firms in the domestic market by anti-selection effects,
which accelerates a welfare loss from protecting inefficient firms by tariffs. Then, whether the former benefit of
tariffs dominates the latter cost depends critically on whether the “trade elasticity” (Arkolakis et al., 2012) is
constant or variable. If the trade elasticity is variable and differs across markets as found by empirical work,3
optimal tariffs can decrease with country size through the trade elasticity, identifying a potential importance
to reconsider existing policy implications.
To help better appreciate the policy result, following Chaney (2008), let us decompose the trade elasticity
into the intensive margin elasticity and the extensive margin elasticity where the former refers to the elasticity
of each incumbent firm’s shipment whereas the latter refers to the elasticity of new entrants’ shipment. Since
the intensive margin elasticity is constant under monopolistic competition and CES preferences, the variable
nature of the trade elasticity should come from the extensive margin elasticity, which in turn depends on the
micro structure of the model. In the homogeneous firm model where all firms export, there is no adjustment
margin from entry of new firms (i.e., the extensive margin elasticity is zero) and the trade elasticity is the same
as the intensive margin elasticity. In the heterogeneous firm model with an unbounded Pareto distribution,
the extensive margin elasticity is constant (Chaney, 2008) and the trade elasticity is constant as well. In these
special cases, country size affects optimal tariffs only through the domestic trade share, so that optimal tariffs
increase with country size (Gros, 1987; Felbermayr et al., 2013). However, the result that the trade elasticity
is constant does not generally hold. Even with a slight generalization of this distribution to a bounded Pareto
distribution with a finite upper bound, the extensive margin elasticity is variable and so is the trade elasticity.
In this more general case, country size affects optimal tariffs not only through the domestic trade share but
also through the trade elasticity. Due to this additional channel that previous work has not taken into account,
we find that optimal tariffs do not necessarily increase with country size.
We then quantitatively measure the discrepancies between optimal tariffs with a constant trade elasticity
and those with a variable trade elasticity. Using a bounded Pareto distribution that makes the trade elasticity
variable and standard parameter values obtained from the US data in Melitz and Redding (2015), we find that
optimal tariffs are 16.6 percent in trade between two symmetric countries, which means that optimal tariffs
with a variable trade elasticity are much lower than those with a constant trade elasticity in the literature.4
In our calibration, the difference in this magnitude mainly stems from the bias that do not control for the
difference in the extensive margin elasticities, rather than the difference in the calibrated parameters adopted in
these papers and ours. Using the analytical solutions of the comparative statics outcomes with respect to trade
liberalization and country size, we also quantitatively compare the difference in bilateral and unilateral impacts
3See Helpman et al. (2008), Novy (2013), Spearot (2013) and Bas et al. (2017) for empirical evidence on substantial variation
in the trade elasticity across country pairs. As in the present paper, Helpman et al. (2008) and Bas et al. (2017) explain the
variation focusing mainly on the extensive margin in monopolistic competition and CES preferences.
4Calibrating their model, Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Ossa (2014) report that optimal tariffs are 26.4 percent and 62 percent
in the heterogeneous firm model under an unbounded Pareto distribution and the homogeneous firm model respectively.
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of these competitive pressures on optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity. We find, for example, that
bilateral reductions in variable trade costs increase optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity two times as
big as optimal tariffs with a constant trade elasticity in the heterogeneous firm model because such reductions
endogenously affect not only the domestic trade share but also the trade elasticity. Interestingly, even though
optimal tariffs increase with country size under an bounded Pareto distribution as in the conventional optimal
tariff theory, changes in optimal tariffs associated with country size are quantitatively very limited, which
implies that large countries would not enjoy a large welfare gain from tariffs in trade war.
A number of papers have explored welfare and policy implications in the homogeneous and heterogeneous
firm models. Regarding welfare implications, Arkolakis et al. (2012) derive a simple formula that can capture
welfare gains only by the domestic trade share and the trade elasticity. As this insight applies to an important
class of trade models, followup papers have examined extension/robustness of the welfare result. For example,
Arkorakis et al. (2019) investigate demand functions that yield variable markups, Felbermayr et al. (2015)
introduce tariffs that raise government revenue, and Melitz and Redding (2015) employ a general productivity
distribution that makes the trade elasticity variable. We show that the welfare formula by Arkolakis et al.
(2012) can be used to reconsider the conventional wisdom of optimal tariffs. In particular, conditional on the
two sufficient statistics for welfare, the optimal level of import tariffs is the same across different trade models
with a constant trade elasticity, but more generally it depends on the micro structure that makes the trade
elasticity variable. We also find that firm heterogeneity distributed from outside unbounded Pareto affects a
welfare measurement as in Melitz and Redding (2015), but the scope of this paper differs from theirs since we
analytically show a new optimal tariff formula with a variable trade elasticity and quantitatively examine the
bilateral and unilateral impacts of two major sources of competitive pressures on optimal tariffs.
As for policy implications, there is a large literature of optimal tariffs. Gros (1987) derives optimal tariffs
in the homogeneous firm model which is inversely related to the trade elasticity and the trading partner’s own
trade share. Using Ossa’s (2011) framework featured with new trade production relocation effects, Ossa (2014)
provides a comprehensive analysis of optimal tariffs in a multi-sector, general equilibrium model which nests
the traditional (terms-of-trade), new trade (profit-shifting) and political-economy motives in the homogeneous
firm model. These analyses of optimal tariffs are extended to the heterogeneous firm model by Demidova and
Rodŕıguez-Clare (2009) for a small economy and Felbermayr et al. (2013) for a large economy. In so doing,
Felbermayr et al. (2013) also show that optimal tariffs are lower in the heterogeneous firm model than the
homogeneous firm model, holding the domestic trade share equal.5 While they find that the optimal level of
import tariffs is strictly positive, one of the crucial limitations is that the trade elasticity is constant in either
the homogeneous or heterogeneous firm model. As stressed by Melitz and Redding (2015), welfare changes are
highly sensitive to the limitation, and even small deviations from this lead to different welfare implications by
making the trade elasticity variable. In the context of trade policy, this implies that optimal tariffs that do
not control for the difference in the extensive margin elasticities lead to a serious bias in policy evaluations.
We highlight this caveat not only by analytically characterizing optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity,
but also by quantitatively measuring their magnitude from our model calibrated to aggregate and firm-level
US data, adopting the technique known as the exact hat algebra in the literature.6
5Recently, Costinot et al. (2020) provide a strict generalization of the optimal tariff results of Gros (1987) in the homogeneous
firm model, and those of Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2009) and Felbermayr et al. (2013) in the heterogeneous firm model with
an unbounded Pareto distribution. As in Felbermayr et al. (2013), they find that optimal tariffs are lower in the heterogeneous
firm model holding only the domestic trade share equal, since self-selection of heterogeneous firms into exports makes the marginal
rate of transformation between exports and local goods of a trading partner non-convex. In contrast, we show that optimal tariffs
can be the same between the two models holding both the domestic trade share and the trade elasticity equal, depending on the
difference in the extensive margin elasticities. If this conditioning is dropped, we find the similar result with theirs.




Consider the Melitz (2003) model with two asymmetric countries indexed by i, j and one differentiated good









, 0 < ρ < 1,
where an elasticity of substitution between varieties is σ = 1/(1− ρ) > 1. Throughout this paper, we denote
the exporting (importing) country by the first (second) subscript. Hence qji(ω) is an export quantity shipped





where Ri is aggregate expenditure of consumers and Pi is an associated price index in country i. Defining an
aggregate good Qi ≡ Ui, these satisfy PiQi = Ri.
To produce varieties, upon paying fixed entry costs fei (measured in country i’s labor units with the wage
wi), a massM
e
i of entrants randomly draw productivity φ from a distribution Gi(φ) with support (φmin, φmax),
where the upper bound is either finite (φmax < ∞) or infinite (φmax = ∞). If a firm from country j chooses
to serve country i, it must incur variable trade costs θji ≥ 1 (with θjj = 1) and fixed trade costs fji (both
measured in country j’s labor units with the wage wj). A government in each country imposes import tariffs
on foreign varieties and the firm must also incur ad valorem tariffs τji = 1+ tji, where τji ≥ 1 (with τjj = 1).
Tariffs are imposed before each firm sets markups, i.e., tariffs are modeled as cost shifters ignoring the aspect
of demand shifters.7 As a result, country i’s government collects tariff revenue (τji − 1)pji(ω)/τji per unit, so
that the firm receives only pji(ω)/τji per unit.



















∗) are strictly decreasing in φ∗.
2.2 Equilibrium Conditions
Under our preference assumption, a firm with productivity φ from country j to country i charges a constant
markup 1/ρ over marginal cost θjiwj/φ and tariffs τji, and firm pricing rule satisfies pji(φ) = τjiθjiwj/(ρφ).
In the presence of tariffs, it is more convenient to define firm revenue net of tariffs rji(φ) = pji(φ)qji(φ)/τji.
























σ−1 = wjfji. (1)
From (1), the ratio of the export productivity cutoff φ∗ji to the domestic productivity cutoff φ
∗












To ensure selection into the export market (φ∗ji > φ
∗
jj), we assume not only that trade costs are large enough
that τσjiθ
σ−1
ji fji/fjj > 1 for i, j but also that relative market demand Bi/Bj – which is proportional to relative
country size Li/Lj – is not too different.
Free entry requires that the expected profits of entering the market in all operating countries should equal





( rin(φ)σ −wifin)dGi(φ) = wif
e
i ). Using the definition of Ji(φ
∗) in Section 2.1,








∗) is strictly decreasing in φ∗, the free entry condition means that there is a one-to-one relationship
between the domestic productivity cutoff φ∗ii and the export productivity cutoff φ
∗
ij .





i ). Using (1), (2) and the definition of Vi(φ
∗) in Section 2.1, the aggregate amount of labor used







n τniRni is aggregate expenditure and Ti = (τji−1)Rji is aggregate tariff revenue in country i.8
Rewriting this equality as Ri = wiLi + Ti helps us to better understand the labor market clearing condition.
This means that country i’s wage wi is determined by the equality between aggregate expenditure Ri and
aggregate labor income wiLi plus aggregate tariff revenue Ti as in the usual general-equilibrium trade models.
It is possible to show that the labor market clearing condition is equivalent with the trade balance condition
(Rij = Rji) in that both conditions induce the same equality, Ri = wiLi + Ti.
To work on the general equilibrium, we need to rewrite the labor market clearing condition further. Let
λji ≡ τjiRji/
∑
n τniRni denote the foreign trade share from country j in country i, which is by definition
inclusive of tariffs τji paid by firms from country j to country i. Rewriting λji as Rjj/Rji = τji(1− λji)/λji,






τji(1− λji) + λji
,
8Since rji is firm revenue net of tariffs, Rji is aggregate revenue (or expenditure) from country j to country i net of tariffs.
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Not surprisingly, we have λ̃ji = λji if country i does not impose import tariffs (τji = 1). We also find it useful
for our analysis to define a “tariff multiplier” (Felbermayr et al., 2015), i.e., the ratio of aggregate expenditure






τji(1− λji) + λji
,
where µi ≥ 1 as tariff revenue is redistributed to consumers and µi = 1 in the absence of tariffs. Finally, using
wiLi =
∑
n Rin (labor income in country i consists of revenues earned by domestic firms and exporting firms
from country i) and Rij = Rji (trade is balanced between countries), the labor market clearing condition is





Since λ̃ij depends on Rij , (3) depends on the productivity cutoffs φ
∗
ij and the market demand Bi determined
by (1) and (2) respectively.
Now, we are ready for characterizing the key variables in levels. For given levels of exogenous variables, an
equilibrium in levels can be defined as a set of {φ∗ii, φ∗ij , Bi, wi} which are jointly characterized by the system
of eight equations in (1), (2), and (3) for i, j, where levels in country j’s wage are normalized to unity by
Walras’s law, setting labor there as a numeraire. Once levels in these key variables are determined, the other
endogenous variables can be written as a function of them. In particular, using the definition of Bi in (1),










where the tariff multiplier µi enters the welfare expression in the present setting because tariff revenue is
rebated back to consumers.
3 Trade Liberalization
The previous section has defined the equilibrium conditions and equilibrium variables in levels. This section
defines the equilibrium conditions and equilibrium variables in changes. We first examine the impact of changes
in trade barriers, holding all other exogenous variables constant. Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013) study
a welfare effect of asymmetric trade liberalization in the Melitz (2003) model, dispensing with the assumption
of an outside good. They show that unilateral reductions in any trade barriers on either exports and imports
always increase welfare in a liberalizing country, which stands in contrast to the presence of an outside good
in the model with CES preferences (Demidova, 2008) and quadratic preferences (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
Here, with the help of the exact hat algebra, we analytically show their result. More importantly, we show
that the endogenous wage can reverse the impact of country size on productivity, just as in the impact of trade
liberalization on welfare in Section 4, and these analytical solutions are shown to be useful for quantifying the
impact of bilateral changes in trade costs on optimal trade policy in Sections 5 and 6.9
9Though the result in this section is not entirely new, optimal tariffs cannot be characterized without the analytical solutions
using the exact hat algebra. In addition, previous work has not computed with a general productivity distribution, which results
in a crucial limitation for policy implications of optimal tariffs.
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Suppose that country i unilaterally reduces trade costs of importing from country j. While we focus mainly
on the impact of variable trade costs, the impacts of fixed trade costs and ad valorem tariffs are qualitatively
similar. In contrast to variable and fixed trade costs, however, tariffs have a different effect on welfare through
tariff revenue rebated back to consumers. Hence, the following analysis should be understood as the impact
of exogenous changes in trade costs. We will characterize welfare-maximizing optimal tariffs after examining
the impact of these exogenous changes.
Under the circumstance, let a “hat” denote proportional changes of variables (x̂ ≡ dx/x). Taking the log
and differentiating the zero profit cutoff condition (1) with respect to θji, we have
B̂i + (σ − 1)φ̂∗ji = σŵj + (σ − 1)θ̂ji. (4)










in = 0. (5)















As will described shortly, changes in λ̃ij in (6) are a function of changes in φ
∗
ii.
Now, we are ready for characterizing the key variables in changes. Just like (1), (2) and (3) can be used to
solve the model for the equilibrium in levels, (4), (5) and (6) can be used to solve for the equilibrium in changes.
In the comparative statics considered here, for given changes in variable trade costs θ̂ji, the equilibrium in
changes is defined as a set of {φ̂∗ii, φ̂∗ij , B̂i, ŵi} which are jointly characterized by the system of eight equations
in (4), (5), and (6) for i, j, where changes in country j’s wage are normalized to zero. Once changes in these
key variables are determined, changes in the other endogenous variables can be written as a function of them.







In what follows, we show that the system of equations (4), (5) and (6) can be solved for the equilibrium
variables in changes. First, rearranging (5) reveals that changes in the export productivity cutoff are a constant
multiple of changes in the domestic productivity cutoff as follows:
















Note that αi > 0 because Ji(φ
∗) is decreasing in φ∗. Hence (7) means that changes in θji always shift φ
∗
ii and
φ∗ij in the opposite directions. The next lemma records some important properties of αi (see Appendix A.3):
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Lemma 1
(i) From the definitions of Ji(φ
∗) and Vi(φ














where αiαj − 1 > 0.















ij . Thus Lemma 1 means that once these productivity cutoffs
are endogenously determined by (1), (2) and (3), αi in turn pins down the foreign trade shares λji, λ̃ji as well
as the tariff multiplier µi.
Next, noting that (3) is rewritten as wiLiαi+1 =
wjLj
αj+1
from Lemma 1 and using the relationship in (7), changes
in the wage in (6) are related to changes in the domestic productivity cutoff as follows:
















ij as in αi, while γin can be regarded as the extensive margin elasticity
(Arkolakis et al., 2012) and thus βi consists of the intensive margin elasticity σ − 1 and the extensive margin
elasticity γin. The next lemma records some important properties of βi (see Appendix A.4):
Lemma 2
(i) From the definition of βi and λ̃ji = 1− λ̃ii, βi/αi is given by
βi
αi
= εij + (γii − γij)(1− λ̃ii),
where εij ≡ σ− 1+ γij is the partial trade elasticity capturing only the direct effect of θij on trade flows
from country i to country j.10
(ii) From the definitions of βi and µi, changes in µi are given by




10Since we only model cost-shifting tariffs, εij is the partial trade elasticity with respect to not only variable trade costs θij
but also tariffs τij (Felbermayr et al., 2015).
9
The first part of Lemma 2 says that βi/αi can be greater or smaller than the partial trade elasticity εij ,
depending on the sign of γii−γij , i.e., the differential in the extensive margin elasticities between the domestic
and export markets. From the definition of γij , we know that the differential depends on Vi(φ
∗) which in
turn depends on the distribution Gi(φ). For example, if φ is drawn from an unbounded Pareto distribution
with a shape parameter k and an infinite upper bound φmax = ∞, we have γii = γij = k − (σ − 1) and hence
βi/αi coincides with εij(= k). This lemma suggests that this property does not always hold under a general
productivity distribution.
The second part says that the domestic productivity cutoff φ∗ii is a single sufficient statistic for welfare even
with tariff revenue.11 Any changes in variable trade costs induce changes in the foreign trade share λji, which
affects redistribution of tariff revenue through the tariff multiplier µi. However, these changes are captured










Observe importantly that βi/αi enters the welfare expression in (9). This suggests that changes in welfare by
variable trade costs depend crucially on the differential γii − γij . Using a bounded Pareto distribution with a
finite upper bound φmax < ∞, Melitz and Redding (2015) show that γii− γij < 0 and missing this differential
tends to understate the absolute changes in welfare. We show that the differential plays an important role in
characterizing a country’s optimal tariffs later.
We now can solve the system of eight equations ((4), (7), (8)) for eight unknowns (φ̂∗ii, φ̂
∗
ij , B̂i, ŵi for i, j),
where we have chosen wj = 1 (hence ŵj = 0) as a numeraire. Solving (4), (7) and (8) simultaneously yields





















(βn − ραn) > 0.




jj and decrease wi. From (9), these changes in turn mean that
welfare rises not only in country j but also in country i because a decline in wi is smaller than a decline in Pi
(hence wi/Pi rises). Tariff revenue rebated back to consumers also increases by raising µi (see Lemma 2(ii)),
which additionally contributes to welfare gains.
















11This holds true for the case of variable trade costs that use real resources. In the case of tariffs that raise revenue, this revenue
affects the welfare analysis (see Section 5).
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where αiαj − 1 > 0 from Lemma 1. In (11), the first term represents the direct effect of reductions in θji,
while the second term represents the indirect effect of such reductions through changes in the terms of trade.
The direct effect lowers (raises) expected profits and induces less (more) firms to enter in a liberalizing (non-
liberalizing) country under free entry. Thus, reductions in θji decrease φ
∗
ii but increase φ
∗
jj . Note that the
direct effect exists even when the wage is exogenously fixed by a freely traded outside good.12 In such a case,
it follows from (9) that reductions in θji decrease (increase) welfare in country i (country j) due to a rise (a
fall) in Pi (Pj). The welfare effect is in line with previous work where unilateral trade liberalization reduces
welfare in a liberalizing country (Demidova, 2008; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
If the wage is endogenous, however, the indirect effect also changes expected profits. A decline in country
i’s relative wage improves (worsens) profitability in country i (country j) by changing production costs, which
leads more (less) firms to enter the domestic market in the respective country under free entry. Hence, if the
wage is endogenous, reductions in wi (induced by reductions in θji) increase φ
∗
ii but decrease φ
∗
jj , which works
in the opposite direction to the direct effect. It follows from the equilibrium outcomes in (10) that the indirect
effect outweighs the direct effect for φ∗ii whereas the converse is true for φ
∗
jj , and thus both cutoffs rise as a
result of reductions in θji.
The finding means that the endogenous wage has a critical impact on the home market effect on the trade





















j is decreasing in θji, which means that
trade liberalization in country i leads to redistribution of firms into the outside good (differentiated good)














From (4) and (11), rij(φ)/rji(φ) is decreasing in θji. This means that trade liberalization in country i changes
the trade patterns in favor of country j, not only through firm entry (extensive margin) but also through firm
revenue (intensive margin). If wi is endogenous without an outside good, (10) shows that the two margins
are not always decreasing in θji, and hence the home market effect is not operative on the trade patterns.
However, trade liberalization increases φ∗ii, φ
∗




ji. From Lemma 1, these changes increase
the foreign trade share λji, λ̃ji, and hence reduce the domestic trade share λii, λ̃ii for i, j, which ensures the
welfare gains from unilateral trade liberalization in both countries (Arkolakis et al., 2012).
Though we have focused on the impact of variable trade costs on imports θji, we can show that the impacts
of any trade costs (θij , θji, fij , fji, τij , τji) on the productivity cutoffs are qualitatively similar (see Appendix













12To introduce an outside good, we require that Li/Lj is not too different across countries to allow for complete specialization
between countries (i.e., if Li/Lj is too different, a small country can specialize in an outside good).
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Thus, reductions in export costs θij also increase the domestic productivity cutoffs in both countries as above.
Only the difference is that reductions in import costs θji decrease wi, whereas reductions in export costs θij
increase wi. The difference reflects the fact that the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect for φ
∗
ii whereas
the converse is true for φ∗jj , because the signs of (11) are opposite in this trade liberalization. The same claim
applies not only to variable trade costs, but also to fixed trade costs and tariffs.
Finally, we can say that, starting from a symmetric situation, the effect of trade liberalization is always
greater in a liberalizing country than in a non-liberalizing country. Regarding variable trade costs on imports




jj . It follows immediately from
(9) that welfare gains from trade liberalization are greater in country i than in country j. Clearly, a similar
claim applies to variable trade costs on exports θij in the sense that, starting from a symmetric situation,
country j enjoys higher welfare gains from trade liberalization than country i.
Proposition 1 Unilateral trade liberalization in variable and fixed trade costs on either exports or imports
as well as tariffs has the following effects:
(i) The relative wage falls in a liberalizing country.
(ii) The domestic (export) productivity cutoff rises (falls), and the domestic (foreign) trade share falls (rises)
in both countries.
(iii) Trade liberalization is unambiguously welfare-enhancing for both countries. Starting from a symmetric
situation, the effect is always greater in a liberalizing country than in a non-liberalizing country.
Proposition 1 is essentially the same as the finding in Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013).13 They show
that the endogenous wage can reverse the impact of asymmetric trade liberalization on welfare in a liberalizing
country due to a failure of the home market effect on the trade patterns without an outside good. While they
graphically show the finding with a simple figure, we analytically show this with the exact hat algebra. More
important, however, is our tractability to study the impact of another competitive measure, i.e., country size,
which can be examined in a parallel manner with trade liberalization without imposing a specific productivity
distribution. Further, the analytical solutions also allow us to quantitatively measure the impact of unilateral
changes in trade costs as well as country size on optimal trade policy.
4 Country Size
Let us next investigate changes in country size, holding all the other exogenous variables constant, which has
been extensively examined in the literature. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) are the first to show that a country
with larger size entails higher productivity and welfare through tougher competition in the domestic market,
thereby reducing average markups across firms. Due to the existence of an outside good sector that gives rise
to the home market effect on the trade patterns, however, they find that trade liberalization and country size
have an opposite impact on welfare in a country of origin: a unilaterally liberalizing country can be worse off
by relocating firm entry from a liberalizing country to a non-liberalizing country (sometimes referred to as
“firm delocation” in the literature).
13The result also relates to Felbermayr and Jung (2012) and Felbermayr et al. (2013), although their analysis is less general
than ours in that their model relies on an unbounded Pareto distribution, whereby variable and fixed trade costs are symmetric.
These restrictions have crucial differences in trade policy implications.
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We show that, in the absence of an outside good, the endogenous wage can reverse the impact of country
size, just as in the impact of unilateral trade liberalization: the domestic productivity cutoff decreases with
country size so that a country with larger size entails lower productivity, which stands in sharp contrast to
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with an outside good. Although a larger country accommodates relatively more
inefficient firms which negatively affects welfare, it can nonetheless enjoy greater welfare gains since a negative
impact on declined productivity is dominated by a positive impact on increased product variety.14
Suppose that country i unilaterally expands market size Li. Denoting proportional changes of variables
by a “hat” once again, and taking the log and differentiating the zero cutoff condition (1) with respect to Li,
B̂j + (σ − 1)φ̂∗ij = σŵi. (12)
While changes in the free entry condition (5) is the same as before, taking the log and differentiating the labor
market clearing condition (3) with respect to Li,





λin + ŵn) + δiiL̂i. (13)
The definition of the equilibrium in changes with respect to Li is similar to that with respect to θji in the
previous section: for given changes in country size L̂i, the equilibrium in changes can be defined as a set of
{φ̂∗ii, φ̂∗ij , B̂i, ŵi} which are jointly characterized by (5), (12), and (13) for i, j, where changes in country j’s
wage are normalized to zero. In the comparative statics here, however, changes in welfare per worker must be
modified because changes in Li have a direct influence on welfare in country i. It follows from Lemma 2 that













which shows that, to know what happens to welfare as a result of unilateral market expansion, we need to
take account of changes in Li as well as changes in φ
∗
ii.
As in unilateral trade liberalization, we can explicitly solve the system of equations in (5), (12), and (13).
Since (5) remains the same, the one-to-one relationship between φ∗ii and φ
∗
ij in (7) also remains the same. In
contrast, changes in the labor market clearing condition (13) are expressed as
ŵi − ŵj = −βiφ̂∗ii + βjφ̂∗jj − L̂i, (15)
where the definitions of αi and βi appearing in the equilibrium in changes are exactly the same as those in
the previous section. Noting that (5), (12), and (15) are eight equations with eight unknowns where wj = 1,














14In the calibration exercise in Section 6, we show that a negative impact on declined productivity is quantitatively very small
relative to a positive impact of increased product variety.
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(16) shows that an increase in Li decreases φ
∗
ii but increases φ
∗
jj and wi. From (14), these changes mean that
an increase in Li always increase welfare in country j, whereas it can increase or decrease welfare in country i,
depending upon the magnitudes of a decline in φ∗ii (declined productivity) and a rise in Li (increased product
variety).










Simple comparison between (11) and (17) immediately reveals that the direct effect of country size is absent
in this case due to the peculiar and restrictive property of monopolistic competition and CES preferences, and
there is only the indirect effect of these increases through changes in the terms of trade. Hence, if ŵi = 0 by a
freely tradable outside good, (17) shows that country size has no impact on the domestic productivity cutoff
(φ̂∗ii = φ̂
∗
jj = 0). Given this, (14) in turn shows that country size increases welfare in country i due solely to
increased product variety, as in the standard heterogeneous firm model with CES preferences (Melitz, 2003),
let alone the homogeneous firm model (Krugman, 1980).
If the wage is endogenous, however, county size indirectly changes expected profits. A rise in country i’s
relative wage worsens (improves) profitability in country i (country j) by changing production costs, which
leads less (more) firms to enter the domestic market in the respective country under free entry. Hence, if the
wage is endogenous, increases in wi (induced by increases in Li) decrease φ
∗
ii but increase φ
∗
jj . It is important
to stress that the negative impact on φ∗ii comes from the home market effect on wi as in Krugman (1980). (The
negative impact is absent in Krugman (1980) because firm productivity levels are exogenously given.) This
causes higher marginal cost and lower profitability in an expanding country, which leads to less competitive
pressures on firms and makes it possible for less productive firms to survive there. Note also that, in contrast
to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in which country size has no impact on the productivity cutoffs of a trading
partner, country size does affect these cutoffs in the present paper through the relative wage that changes
competitiveness across trading countries.
As with unilateral trade liberalization, the home market effect on the trade patterns (induced by increases
in country size) does not always work in the presence of the endogenous wage. From the labor market clearing



















Furthermore, let Mii = [1−Gi(φ∗ii)]Mei and Mij = [1−Gi(φ∗ij)]Mei respectively denote the mass of domestic





















If wi is exogenous, country size has no impact on the productivity cutoffs and the values in the brackets above.
Since the mass of entrants Mei /M
e
j increases proportionately to country size Li/Lj in the present model with
a single differentiated good sector, the mass of domestic firms Mii/Mjj and exporting firms Mij/Mji also
increases proportionately to country size. Therefore, market expansion in country i gives rise to the following
14










From (12) and (17), we have that firm revenue rij(φ)/rji(φ) is not affected by country size. If wi is endogenous,
in contrast, country size has an impact on the productivity cutoffs and the values in the brackets above. While
the mass of entrants does not necessarily increase more than proportionately to country size and thereby the
home market effect is not operative on the trade patterns, the comparative statics in (16) show that the mass
of domestic firms (exporting firms) always increases more (less) than proportionately to the mass of entrants.










Further, rij(φ)/rji(φ) is also decreasing in Li. This means that market expansion in country i changes the
trade patterns in favor of country j through both the extensive and intensive margins. Intuitively, country i
with a relatively higher proportion of consumers has more incentive to save trade costs that are high enough to
generate selection; thus firms find it less (more) profitable to export their goods to a smaller (larger) country.
As a result, if country i is relatively larger than country j, the size difference allows relatively less (more)
exporting firms to exist in country i (country j). Just like unilateral trade liberalization has a crucial impact on
welfare by the shift in the trade patterns, unilateral market expansion also has a crucial impact on welfare by
the shift from an expanding country with the high wage to a non-expanding country with the low wage. This
finding is in line with recent research of monopolistic competition in which the wage (or per-capita income)
plays a pivotal role. For example, in a model with additively separable indirect utilities, Bertoletti and Etro
(2017) show that the shift in the trade pattern can be thought of as business destruction (creation) where a
rich (poor) country with the high (low) wage is characterized by concentration (expansion) of exporting firms.
In our model with CES preferences, the shift arises only when the wage is endogenous.
The fact that country size affects selection also yields empirically consistent predictions that larger (smaller)
countries tend to be less (more) open. At the aggregate level, the domestic trade share in total expenditure








Since φ∗ii is decreasing in Li and αi is decreasing in φ
∗
ii, the share is increasing in country size: the domestic
spending share is higher, the larger is country size, as documented by aggregate data from various countries
(Eaton and Kortum, 2002, 2011). While the large domestic trade share would encourage firms to export those
products for which they have the large domestic market (known as the Linder hypothesis), this is not the case
in our model due to the feedback from country size to selection. At the firm level, the ratio of exporting firms







15In a multi-sector version of the model with an outside good, it can be easily shown that the mass of entrants rises more than
proportionately to country size. This generates the home market effect on the trade pattens such that an increase in country size
leads to disproportionately reallocations of labor to the differentiated good sectors, thereby allowing a larger country to enjoy
higher welfare gains through increased product variety. Note, however, that the above entry pattern still holds even in this case.
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It follows from (16) that the ratio is decreasing in country size, which implies that the share of exporting firms
among operating firms is lower, the greater is country size. This is also in line with empirical evidence using
firm-level data. Bernard et al. (2007) find that 18 percent of firms export in the United States, while Mayer
and Ottaviano (2008) report that a much larger fraction of firms export in European countries.16
It remains to show the impact of country size on welfare in an expanding country. The impact depends on
the magnitudes of a decline in φ∗ii and a rise in Li, where the former gives rise to a welfare loss by increasing the
domestic trade share λii, λ̃ii there. Applying (16) and rearranging, changes in welfare (14) can be expressed
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Since unilateral market expansion in country i decreases φ∗ii, such expansion leads to a welfare gain in that
country if the value in the brackets is negative. Unfortunately this is not always the case, and we cannot say
in general that the country gains from market expansion in the current model. It is possible to prove, however,
that starting from a symmetric situation and free trade (µi = 1), unilateral market expansion in country i
unambiguously improves welfare in both countries.
Proposition 2 Unilateral market expansion has the following effects:
(i) The relative wage rises in an expanding country.
(ii) The domestic (export) productivity cutoff falls (rises), and the domestic (foreign) trade share rises (falls)
in an expanding country. The converse is true in a non-expanding country.
(iii) Starting from a symmetric situation and free trade, market expansion is unambiguously welfare-enhancing
for both countries.
The result in Proposition 2 has a noticeable difference from that in the existing literature. In an influential
study on allocation efficiency with VES preferences, Dhingra and Morrow (2019) find that market expansion
provides a welfare gain when consumers’ preferences are “aligned,” i.e., demand shifts alter private and social
markups in the same directions. This means that market expansion increases welfare in CES preferences, but
this is not true in our model. The reason is that unilateral market expansion entails anti-selection effects that
work to decline productivity in a country of origin. As shown by Dhingra and Morrow (2019), one of sufficient
conditions for welfare gains is that productivity does not decline after market expansion, which is not satisfied
here. Hence, market expansion does not always lead to gains due to distortions from anti-selection effects in
our setting, whereas distortions stem from variable markups in their setting.17
5 Trade Policy
So far, we have examined the impact of exogenous changes in the two competitive measures on key endogenous
variables without specifying a productivity distribution function. In this section, we show that the generality
is important for the characterization of a country’s optimal trade policy.
16See also Amiti et al. (2014) who report that 24 percent of firms export in Belgium. Of course, this cannot be explained only
by the difference in market size and it also reflects other economic factors such as the difference in trade costs and technology.
17Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013) and Felbermayr and Jung (2018) also show similar results but the analysis of market
size is confined to an unbounded Pareto distribution. We show that this limitation has serious policy implications in next sections.
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5.1 Optimal Tariffs
Suppose that country i chooses a tariff rate on imports from country j to maximize welfare. For the moment,
we focus on the effect of country i’s tariffs τji holding country j’s tariffs τij fixed, and derive optimal tariffs
that maximize country i’s welfare. In country j that faces tariffs by country i, the effect of τji is essentially










From Proposition 1, an increase in τji decreases the domestic productivity cutoff φ
∗
jj which lowers welfare in
country j. In country i that imposes tariffs on country j, on the other hand, there is an additional effect of
τji on welfare through changes in redistribution of tariff revenue, which contributes to a welfare gain there.
Noting that changes in the tariff multiplier µi with respect to τji in Lemma 2 are given by

















In this expression of welfare changes, the first term is a welfare loss from tariffs (as inefficient firms are sheltered
by tariffs), and the second term is a welfare gain from tariffs (as tariff revenue is rebated back to consumers).











Recall from Proposition 1 that an increase in τji also decreases φ
∗
ii. Setting τji = 1 in (18) then implies that a
small import tariff τji unambiguously improves country i’s welfare (which comes at the expense of country j),
and therefore the welfare-maximizing optimal tariffs are strictly positive for country i. We can also say that,
starting from a symmetric situation, country i’s gain from tariffs cannot compensate country j’s loss and thus
the effect of τji on world welfare is always negative.
Before moving to characterizing country i’s optimal tariffs, it is useful to relate the expression in (18) with










Welfare changes in (19) encompass the results in Arkolakis et al. (2012) without tariff revenue (i.e., µi = 1
and hence µ̂i = 0) and those in Felbermayr et al. (2015) with tariff revenue for the Melitz (2003) model under
an unbounded Pareto distribution with a shape parameter k and an infinite upper bound φmax = ∞. In fact,
noting that the extensive margin elasticity is constant at k− (σ−1) and βi/αi coincides with the partial trade












where η ≡ kσ−1 (1+
1−σ
k ) > 0. The above expression shows that welfare changes can be captured solely by the
two sufficient statistics λii and εij without tariff revenue as indicated by the first term (Arkolakis et al., 2012),
but their welfare formula requires qualification with tariff revenue if tariffs act as cost shifters as indicated by
the second term (Felbermayr et al., 2015).
The results however depend critically on the assumption that the trade elasticity is constant, as stressed
by Melitz and Redding (2015). To see this caveat in the current setting, using the general expression of βi/αi
in Lemma 2 and rearranging, we can further express (19) as
Ŵi =
1









εij + γii − γij
)
µ̂i. (20)
This expression is a counterpart to that in Melitz and Redding (2015, eq. (33)), albeit the difference that we
derive welfare changes by tariffs that raise government revenue. Note that, beside the domestic trade share λii
and the trade elasticity εij , welfare changes depend on the extensive margin elasticity differential between the
domestic and export markets γii−γij , which they refer to as the “hazard differential.” They argue that, when
the differential exists, the micro structure matters for welfare beyond the domestic trade share and the trade
elasticity, causing substantial discrepancies in welfare changes by variable trade costs between a constant and
variable trade elasticity. The welfare expression in (20) indicates that the same critique applies to the analysis
of tariffs.18
Under which productivity distributions does the extensive margin elasticity differential exist? Obviously,
γii = γij = k− (σ− 1) under an unbounded Pareto distribution. Consider a slight generalization from this to
a bounded Pareto distribution with a shape parameter k and a finite upper bound φmax < ∞. In this more
general case, the extensive margin elasticity is expressed as (Melitz and Redding, 2015)














where unbounded Pareto can be treated as a limit case in which limφmax→∞ γin = k− (σ− 1). It is easily seen
that γin is strictly increasing in the productivity cutoff φ
∗
in. From this, we have that (i) the trade elasticity
εij = σ − 1 + γij is variable and differs across markets; and (ii) γii − γij < 0 under selection into the export
market. Using bounded Pareto, Melitz and Redding (2015) show that if the extensive margin is more elastic
in the export market than in the domestic market (γii−γij < 0), welfare changes are under-estimated relative
to those without this differential. We show that missing the differential leads to a serious bias in evaluations of
optimal tariffs. While we will mainly consider bounded Pareto to deliver key policy implications, the fact that
the trade elasticity is variable and differs across markets is not specific to this distribution. For example, noting
that the gravity equation with a constant trade elasticity is mis-specified under any distribution other than
unbounded Pareto, Head et al. (2014) explore the welfare gains from trade under a log-normal distribution.
As in bounded-Pareto heterogeneity, log-normal heterogeneity induces a variable trade elasticity along with
a negative differential, yielding important differences in the welfare gains from trade liberalization. Similarly,
comparing unbounded Pareto and log-normal as potential distributions of firm heterogeneity, Bas et al. (2017)
show that the latter distribution does a better job at matching theory and evidence.
18The differential also has a crucial impact on the mass of entrants. Under the unbounded Pareto distribution where γii−γij = 0,
the mass does not respond to changes in exogenous variables and hence M̂ei = 0. More generally, we can show that if γii−γij ⋚ 0,
changes in the mass of entrants are given by M̂ei ⋛ 0 (see Appendix A.4).
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We now turn to characterizing the optimal tariffs for country i. Setting Ŵi = 0 in (18) and solving for τji
yields the following expression for the optimal tariffs:19















Moreover, using λ̃jj = αj/(αj + 1) from Lemma 1 and substituting βj/αj from Lemma 2, the optimal tariffs





εji + (γjj − γji)(1− λ̃jj)− ρ
) . (21)
Hence, the optimal tariffs in country i are inversely related to country j’s export supply elasticity, which is
composed of the domestic trade share in country j (λ̃jj) and the trade elasticity from country j to country i
(εji), as in the existing models in the literature. The crucial difference, however, is that the trade elasticity is
not necessarily constant in this model.
It is worth stressing that the optimal tariff in (21) is a generalization of some of well-known optimal tariff
formulas. If the underlying distribution is assumed to be unbounded Pareto with a shape parameter k and an
infinite upper bound φmax = ∞, the extensive margin elasticities γjj , γji are constant at k − (σ − 1) and the





This expression is exactly the same as the optimal tariffs shown by Felbermayr et al. (2013) in a heterogeneous
firm model a la Melitz (2003) under the unbounded Pareto distribution. Further, it is also possible to consider
a homogeneous firm model as a special case with a degenerated productivity distribution in which firms draw
their productivity level of either zero or an exogenous productivity cutoff (see Melitz and Redding (2015) for
details). If fixed and variable trade costs are sufficiently low that all homogeneous firms export in this model,
we can easily show that the extensive margin elasticities γjj , γji are constant at zero and the trade elasticity





This expression is exactly the same as the optimal tariffs shown by Gros (1987) in a homogeneous firm model
a la Krugman (1980).
At this standpoint, we need to mention two caveats for the optimal tariff formula in (21). First, we cannot
say that the optimal tariffs are smaller in the heterogeneous firm model than in the homogeneous firm model.
Just like the different trade models yield the different domestic trade shares λ̃jj , these models also yield the
different trade elasticities εji. This means that the optimal tariffs in the different trade models are not directly
comparable without taking account of the difference in the trade elasticity. The optimal tariff formula in (21)
is useful to shed light on this point. Plugging (21) in γjj −γji = 0 that holds in the heterogeneous model with
19Following Felbermayr et al. (2013), we use the F.O.C. of welfare maximization (18) assuming the sufficiency to be satisfied.
Instead of using the F.O.C., Demidova (2017) looks at the direct impact of tariffs on aggregate quantity and finds the result that
strongly resembles the one derived by Felbermayr et al. (2013).
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unbounded Pareto and the homogeneous firm model, we find that conditional the two empirically observable
moments above, the optimal tariffs are the same between the different trade models. Of course, the result is a
direct implication of the insight by Arkolakis et al. (2012) for the optimal tariff setting: conditional on the two
sufficient statistics for welfare λ̃jj , εji, changes in welfare induced by tariffs are the same and, consequently,
levels of the optimal tariffs are also the same.
Second, the equivalence of the optimal tariffs between the different trade models holds only if the extensive
margin elasticity differential is zero, i.e., γjj − γji = 0. If this does not hold, the optimal tariffs are different
even after controlling for the two sufficient statistics for welfare. For example, if the extensive margin is more
elastic in the export market than in the domestic market (γii − γij < 0), welfare changes by tariffs tend to be
under-estimated relative to those without this differential as seen in (20). Noting that the welfare-maximizing
optimal tariffs are strictly positive in country i, this implies in our policy context that the government faces
a smaller welfare loss from an increase in tariffs and therefore has more incentive to impose higher tariffs for
γii − γij < 0 than for γii − γij = 0. In other words, the optimal tariffs that do not control for the differential
γjj − γji tend to be under-estimated since εji > εji + (γjj − γji)(1− λ̃jj) in (21). Only in the special case of
no differential, are the optimal tariffs the same across the different trade models.
Proposition 3 Conditional on the domestic trade share and the trade elasticity, the optimal tariffs have the
following properties:
(i) If the extensive margin elasticity is the same between domestic and export markets, levels of the optimal
tariffs are the same across different trade models.
(ii) If the extensive margin is more (less) elastic in the export market than in the domestic market, levels of
the optimal tariffs are greater (smaller) than those in the absence of this differential.
In Proposition 3, we compare the optimal tariffs across the different trade models, holding both the domestic
trade share and the trade elasticity equal that endogenously arise in the respective model. If the optimal tariffs
are compared without such conditioning, the proposition no longer holds. The optimal tariffs in (21), (22) and
(23) depend on the domestic trade share, which is a function of tariffs and hence is not always the same level.
The fact that the optimal tariffs are implicitly characterized means that we cannot solve for the optimal tariffs
in closed forms as in existing work (e.g., Gros, 1987; Felbermayr et al. 2013).20 The optimal tariff formula in
(21) makes it more difficult to compare the optimal tariffs across the different trade models since not only is
the domestic trade share but also the trade elasticity and the hazard differential are also a function of tariffs.
Hence, without conditioning above, it is potentially ambiguous to see which optimal tariffs are lower across
the different trade models analytically. To figure out this comparison, we use numerical illustrations with the
calibrated parameters in the next section.
Next, we examine the impacts of trade costs and country size on the optimal tariffs. Let us consider the
optimal tariffs with a constant trade elasticity in (22) and (23), where changes in the exogenous variables affect
the optimal tariffs only through the domestic trade share. Proposition 1 says that reductions in any trade costs
increase the domestic productivity cutoff φ∗jj , which decrease the domestic trade share λ̃jj . Proposition 2 says
that increases in country i’s market size (or decreases in country j’s size) increase φ∗jj , which also decrease λ̃jj .
These comparative statics mean that the optimal tariffs for country i are higher, the lower are any trade costs
between countries or the larger is country i’s relative size. Further noting that reductions in country j’s tariffs
20From this reason, Felbermayr et al. (2013) compare the optimal tariffs in the heterogeneous firm model and the homogeneous
firm model, holding only the domestic trade share equal. Costinot et al. (2020) also compare the optimal tariffs in a similar way.
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increase country i’s optimal tariffs, the best response function is downward-sloping so that tariffs are strategic
substitutes. These properties of the optimal tariffs hold true for those with a constant trade elasticity in the
literature; see Gros (1987) for the homogeneous firm model and Felbermayr et al. (2013) for the heterogeneous
firm model. If we consider the optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity in (21), however, these properties
are not necessarily satisfied since changes in the exogenous variables affect the optimal tariffs not only through
the domestic trade share but also through the trade elasticity.
This additional channel for the optimal tariffs can be shown more formally by making clear the relationship
between the extensive margin elasticity differential and the partial trade elasticity in a general productivity
distribution. Applying the comparative statics in Propositions 1 and 2 to Lemma 2, the following lemma is
immediately obtained (see Appendix A.8).21
Lemma 3
(i) If the extensive margin is more (less) elastic in the export market than in the domestic market, reductions
in trade costs between countries decrease (increase) the trade elasticity.
(ii) If the extensive margin is more (less) elastic in the export market than in the domestic market, increases
in country i’s relative market size decrease (increase) the trade elasticity.
Lemma 3 implies that, if γjj −γji ̸= 0, the trade elasticity is not constant and hence differs across markets.
In the case of variable trade costs, for example, we have






If the extensive margin is more elastic in the export market than in the domestic market where the differential is
negative, reductions in variable trade costs decrease the trade elasticity. This accords with empirical evidence
that the trade elasticity is smaller when trade liberalization concerns country pairs where the trade volume is
already large (Bas et al., 2017). Only in the special case of no differential, is the trade elasticity invariant to
any trade costs and the same across markets.
It is easily shown that changes in the exogenous variables have an additional effect on the optimal tariffs.
Consider reductions in variable trade costs θji. If the differential is negative (γjj − γji < 0), such reductions
decrease the partial trade elasticity (
dεji
dθji




follows immediately from (21) that, due to an extra adjustment through εji that is absent in (22) and (23),
the impact on the optimal tariffs is reinforced. If the differential is positive, the converse is true in that the
impact on the optimal tariffs is attenuated. Only when there is no differential, is the partial trade elasticity
constant and reductions in θji affect the optimal tariffs only through decreases in the domestic trade share.
These highlight a potential bias in evaluating the optimal tariffs without allowing for a variable trade elasticity
that differs across markets. In other words, the optimal tariffs that do not control for the differential tend to
be under/over-estimated not only in terms of levels but also in terms of changes induced by exogenous shocks
(see Appendix A.9).
21Strictly speaking, we require that the extensive margin elasticity γji is a monotonic function in the productivity cutoff φ
∗
ji
for this lemma. With this restriction, the sign of γjj − γji is the same for a given productivity distribution and does not change
with the key exogenous variables so long as export market selection is ensured. As seen above, the property holds for a bounded
Pareto distribution (Head et al. (2014) show this for a log-normal distribution), in which case the sign of the differential does not
switch in the comparative statics exercises here. We are not sure if this always holds for other popular productivity distributions
and the discussion below simply bypasses the question.
21
Proposition 4 Reductions in trade costs between countries or increases in country i’s relative market size
have the following effects on the optimal tariffs:
(i) If the extensive margin elasticity is the same between the domestic and export markets, they increase the
optimal tariffs only through decreases in the domestic trade share.
(ii) If the extensive margin is more (less) elastic in the export market than in the domestic market, they
reinforce (attenuate) the impact on the optimal tariffs through decreases (increases) in the trade elasticity.
One of interesting results in this proposition arises when γjj − γji > 0 and increases in the trade elasticity
(induced by exogenous shocks) are greater than decreases in the domestic trade share. In this case, the model
predicts that the optimal tariffs for country i are lower, the lower are trade costs between the two countries
and the larger is relative size in country i. The impact of country size on the optimal tariffs accords with recent
research. For example, Naito (2019) finds a significant negative relationship between GDP and tariffs across
countries, meaning that larger countries tend to set lower tariffs. To account for this fact that is inconsistent
with the existing optimal tariff theory, Naito (2019) develops a dynamic Ricardian model in which long-run
welfare effects of tariffs on revenue and economic growth jointly characterize the optimal tariffs, which is shown
to be decreasing in a country’s absolute advantage parameter.
While the present model yields a similar prediction, the mechanism behind the result is different.22 Our
model predicts that a larger country accommodates relatively more inefficient firms in the domestic market
by lowering the domestic productivity cutoff which negatively affects welfare. If a larger country is allowed
to choose tariffs to maximize welfare, it can enjoy a terms-of-trade gain by setting higher tariffs in our model
as in the conventional optimal tariff theory. At the same time, however, such tariffs also accelerate a welfare
loss from protecting inefficient firms because a larger country suffers from anti-selection effects in the domestic
market. Taking these effects together, the optimal tariffs are decreasing in country size only if a welfare loss
from protecting inefficient firms is stronger than a welfare gain from improving the terms-of-trade, which can
occur under the condition that γjj −γji > 0 in this model. If this is the case, a larger country does not always
benefit from higher tariffs due to the feedback from country size to firm election. In the next section, we also
show that, even if γjj − γji < 0 so that the optimal tariffs are increasing in country size as in the conventional
optimal tariff theory, the impact of country size on the optimal tariffs is quantitatively very limited relative
to what one would expect from the findings in the existing literature.
5.2 Nash Tariffs
We have characterized the optimal tariffs in country i, taking tariffs in country j as given without fearing any
retaliation. Now consider the situation in which both countries set tariffs so as to maximize respective welfare
but country i sets tariffs taking account of the possibility to retaliate against country j’s tariffs and vice versa.
From Lemma 3, we know that if γjj − γji ≤ 0, country i’s optimal tariffs are decreasing in country j’s tariffs,
since an increase in τij leads to decreases in λ̃jj and εji. As indicated earlier, the best response functions
are downward-sloping and the optimal tariffs are strategic substitutes for one another. If γjj − γji > 0 and
increases in εji are greater than decreases in λ̃jj , country i’s optimal tariffs are increasing in country j’s tariffs.
In this case, the best response functions are upward-sloping and the optimal tariffs are strategic complements
for one another. As usual, the optimal tariffs in Nash equilibrium are determined at which the best response
22From the finding in Section 4, the larger country i’s size Li, the larger its national income wiLi + (τji − 1)Rji for given τji.
Hence, a larger country entails larger GDP as well as GDP per capita in this model.
22
functions intersect in the (τji, τij) space, but the variable nature of the trade elasticity alters the equilibrium
properties of such tariffs. Further, the optimal tariffs are bounded from above and below in Nash equilibrium.
On the one hand, if tariffs are sufficiently high that no firm exports from country i, the domestic trade share
in country j approaches to unity in (21). Thus, the lower bound of the optimal tariffs are







On the other hand, if trade costs are sufficiently low that all operating firms export from country j (φ∗jj = φ
∗
ji),
we have αj = fjj/fji (from the definition of αj) and γjj = γji (from the definition of γji) giving rise to
βj/αj = εji. Using these and λ̃jj = αj/(αj + 1) in (21), the upper bound of the optimal tariffs are
















Note from Lemma 2 and Proposition 4 that, unless γjj − γji = 0, both τ∗ji and τ∗ji are variable in the present
model with a general productivity distribution. Therefore, these bounds vary endogenously with changes in
the exogenous variables.
To better appreciate the equilibrium properties of the Nash tariffs, we follow Felbermayr et al. (2013) in
assuming that the two countries are symmetric and choose their tariff non-cooperatively. In Nash equilibrium,
they impose the same optimal tariffs τ∗ij = τ
∗
ji ≡ τ∗ with the equalized wage across countries wi = wj ≡ w = 1.
Exploiting the symmetry, let us also define
θij = θji ≡ θ, fii = fjj ≡ fd, fij = fji ≡ fx, Li = Lj ≡ L, φ∗ii = φ∗jj ≡ φ∗d, φ∗ij = φ∗ji ≡ φ∗x,
λ̃ii = λ̃jj ≡ λ̃, εij = εji ≡ ε, γii = γjj ≡ γd, γij = γji ≡ γx, αi = αj ≡ α, βi = βj ≡ β.
Then, finding the Nash tariffs is equivalent to finding a solution to the fixed point problem τ = f(τ) in (21)
where the dependence of f(τ) on θ, fx and L is understood:




ε− (γd − γx)(1− λ̃)− ρ
) .
Since all of the key endogenous variables (i.e., λ̃, ε, γd − γx) are a function of tariffs, the fixed point problem
only implicitly characterizes the Nash tariffs as in the optimal tariffs in the previous subsection. Nevertheless,
we can discuss the following equilibrium properties of the Nash tariffs.
From Propositions 1 and 4, if γd − γx < 0, we know that not only is the domestic trade share λ̃ but also
the trade elasticity ε is increasing in τ . In this case, f(τ) is strictly decreasing in τ , reflecting that tariffs are
strategic substitutes. In contrast, if γd−γx > 0, λ̃ is increasing in τ but ε is decreasing in τ . In this case, f(τ)
is strictly increasing in τ under the condition that reductions in τ lead to increases in ε relatively more than
decreases in λ̃, reflecting that tariffs are strategic complements. Figure 2 depicts a 45-degree line plus a f(τ)
curve for two possible cases: tariffs are strategic substitutes in Panel A and tariffs are strategic complements
in Panel B. In either panel, the Nash tariffs are found at which a 45-degree line and a f(τ) curve intersect.
Such tariffs lie within the shaded area in the figure where the lower and upper bounds are respectively denoted
by τ∗ij = τ
∗
ji ≡ τ∗ and τ∗ij = τ∗ji ≡ τ∗.
23This bound also represents country i’s optimal tariffs when country i is treated as a limit case of a small economy (λ̃jj = 1).
From Lemma 2, βj/αj = k with unbounded Pareto and hence τ
∗
ji = k/(k − ρ) as in Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2009).
23














Figure 2 – Effect of trade liberalization on Nash tariffs
Consider the impact of trade liberalization at the symmetric situation. Bilateral reductions in trade costs
(both variable θ and fixed fx) decrease the domestic trade share λ̃ as in unilateral reductions in these costs.
We should note however that the magnitude of a decline in λ̃ is different between them, which can be seen
from the impact on the productivity cutoffs. In the case of variable trade costs θ, for example, solving the
system of three equations ((4), (5)) at the symmetric situation for three unknowns (φ̂∗d, φ̂
∗








Comparing (10) and (24) reveals that reductions in variable trade costs have different impacts on the cutoffs.
Since λ̃ = α/(α+ 1) from Lemma 1, reductions in θ also have different impacts on the domestic trade share.
On top of that, if the differential is negative (γd − γx < 0), such reductions also decrease the trade elasticity
ε. In this case, the f(τ) curve shifts up and the Nash tariffs τ∗ become higher, thereby narrowing the gap
between the upper and lower bounds (i.e., tariffs tend to converge) as a result of such reductions in Panel A.
If the differential is positive (γd − γx > 0), the converse is true in Panel B. Finally, if the differential is zero
(γd − γx = 0), such reductions have no impact on ε and the Nash tariffs τ∗ become higher only through a
decline in λ̃, thereby leaving the two bounds unaffected.
Consider next the impact of market size at the symmetric situation. Bilateral increases in market size (L)
have no impact on the domestic trade share λ̃, because the indirect effect through the terms-of-trade is not
operative at the symmetric situation with the equalized wage ŵi = ŵj = 0 (see (17)).
24 As a result of this,
bilateral increases in market size have no effect on the productivity cutoffs at all. Noting that the extensive
margin elasticities γd, γx are a function of these cutoffs, this also means that market size has no effect on the
partial trade elasticity ε = σ−1+γx and the extensive margin elasticity differential γd−γx. Consequently, the
f(τ) curve does not shift at all, so that the Nash tariffs τ∗ and the two bounds τ∗, τ∗ also remain unchanged.
In contrast to trade liberalization above, this impact of market size necessarily holds irrespective of the sign
of the differential γd − γx (see Appendix A.10).
24As in trade costs, unilateral changes in market size have different impacts on the cutoffs from bilateral changes; see (16).
24
The important upshot of our argument is that policy evaluations of the Nash tariffs that do not control for
the differential γd−γx can lead to a serious bias even in an environment in which countries choose tariffs non-
cooperatively. This is of particular importance for assessment of trade policy in globalization where reductions
in transportation or communication costs are significant across countries. Our model reveals that, whenever
γd−γx ̸= 0, there is an additional channel through which trade costs endogenously affect the Nash tariffs, i.e.,
a variable trade elasticity. In fact, recent work using firm-level data has identified empirical relevance of this
aspect, paying particular attention to the role of the extensive margin. For example, estimating trade flows
in their generalized gravity equation featured with firm heterogeneity under the bounded Pareto distribution,
Helpman et al. (2008) find substantial variation in the trade elasticity with respect to observable trade costs
(such as distance) between country pairs, which means that γd−γx ̸= 0.25 Calibrating their heterogeneous firm
model under the bounded Pareto distribution into US firm-level data, Melitz and Redding (2015) also show
that missing the variable nature of the trade elasticity can give rise to a quantitatively large discrepancy from
the true welfare gains from trade liberalization. In the context of trade policy, these insights suggest that the
micro structure that makes the trade elasticity variable matters for evaluating the Nash tariffs correctly, since
globalization has a crucial impact on the characterization of the Nash tariffs not only through the domestic
trade share but also through the trade elasticity. As emphasized by Melitz and Redding (2015), these economic
factors are empirically observable moments, and therefore we need to take fully into account these objects for
trade policy evaluations. In the next section, we calibrate the optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity
(21) and compare them with those with a constant trade elasticity in (22) and (23), in order to quantitatively
assess a potential bias that arises from omitting the important aspect of γd − γx ̸= 0.
Proposition 5 Evaluating at a symmetric situation, the Nash tariffs have the following equilibrium properties:
(i) If the extensive margin elasticity is the same between the domestic and export markets, reductions in
trade costs increase the Nash tariffs only through decreases in the domestic trade share.
(ii) If the extensive margin is more (less) elastic in the export market than in the domestic market, they
reinforce (attenuate) the impact on the Nash tariffs through decreases (increases) in the trade elasticity.
(iii) Regardless of the sign of the extensive margin elasticity differential, market size has no impact on the
Nash tariffs.
We conclude this section by mentioning the welfare effect of the exogenous variables in Nash equilibrium
evaluated at the symmetric situation. First, welfare changes with respect to variable trade costs in (9) similarly
hold in Nash equilibrium, and bilateral reductions in variable trade costs improve welfare due to a rise in φ∗d.
Next, welfare changes with respect to market size in (14) are simply given by Ŵ = L̂/(σ − 1), since a fall in
the productivity cutoff does not enter stems from that φ∗d is invariant to market size with the equalized wage.
Thus bilateral increases in market size improve welfare due solely to increased product variety even with tariff
revenue. Finally, welfare changes with respect to tariffs in (18) are expressed as
Ŵ =
(




and bilateral reductions in tariffs (from τ ≥ 1) improve welfare by increasing in φ∗d.
25See Head et al. (2014) and Bas et al. (2017) for similar findings under the log-normal distribution. In explaining the variation,
they also focus on the role of the extensive margin.
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6 Quantitative Relevance
This section shows the quantitative relevance of the theoretical results. To calibrate the model, we mainly use
a bounded Pareto distribution that makes the trade elasticity variable. We treat country i as the rest of the
world (ROW) and country j as the United States, and choose the standard parameter values obtained from
the US data. We first examine the impact of bilateral changes in trade costs on the optimal tariffs, and then
examine the impact of unilateral changes in trade costs and market size on the optimal tariffs. In both cases,
the optimal tariffs are evaluated at a symmetric situation in an initial equilibrium.
6.1 Calibration
We choose the elasticity of substitution between varieties σ = 4 and hence ρ = (σ − 1)/σ = 0.75. We also set
the number of workers equal to the US labor force and Lj = 148 million in 2002, and choose US labor as a
numeraire wj = 1. In the initial equilibrium, the two countries have the same labor force and wage. From the
finding in Section 5, this suggests that the impact of bilateral changes in market size (in terms of labor force)
has no impact on the optimal tariffs. In contrast, from the finding in Section 4, the the impact of unilateral
changes in market size has an impact on the optimal tariffs by changing the wage.
Following Melitz and Redding (2015), we calibrate θji and τji to match the average fraction of exports in
firm sales in US manufacturing, which is 0.14 (Bernard et al., 2007). In contrast to their study that matches







= 0.14 in the current study.
We set τji equal to 1.045 which matches the world applies tariff rate (weighted mean, all products) in 2002.
26
Together with σ = 4, we get θji = 1.7. We also set fji equal to 0.535 and normalize fjj = f
e
j = 1 as those in
Melitz and Redding (2015).












For simplicity, the distribution is assumed to be the same across two countries with the same parameter values.
We set the shape parameter k = 4.25 and normalize the scale parameter φmin = 1. We set the upper bound of
the bounded Pareto distribution φmax equal to 2.85 as in Melitz and Redding (2015). Given the distribution,




















The average share of firms that export in US manufacturing is 0.18 (Bernard et al., 2007). In order to match
the number, we need to know the values of two unknowns φ∗jj , φ
∗
ji in the initial equilibrium. Another system of










26The world tariff rate and US labor force are obtained from the World Bank Data. Since Bernard et al. (2007) use the data
in year 2002, we also choose the data in the same year for these variables.
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)− kσ−1 − χji .
Plugging the calibrated parameters yields φ∗jj = 1.16 and φ
∗
ji = 1.70 under the bounded Pareto distribution.
Note that these cutoffs are not uniquely determined under the unbounded Pareto distribution with φmax = ∞.
Once the values of these cutoffs are determined, the other key endogenous variables are automatically pinned
down, as shown in Lemma 1.
An implicit solution of the optimal tariffs for country i is given in (21). This denotes the optimal tariffs set
by country i on exports from country j (i.e., optimal tariffs for ROW). We do not consider t∗ij (i.e., optimal
tariffs for US) here, because we use the calibrated values from the US data for the three endogenous variables,
εji, γjj − γji, λ̃jj in (21), all of which are those of country j. If we try to quantify the optimal tariffs for US,
we instead need information of the above three observable moments of the ROW, which are harder to find in
the empirical literature than those of US. In the quantitative exercise that follows, therefore, we quantify the
optimal tariffs faced by US firms.
The key endogenous variables in (21) are given by
εji = σ − 1 + γji,



























evaluated at the symmetric situation. Using the productivity cutoffs obtained from the calibrated parameters,
we can quantify the three empirically observable moments and thus the optimal tariffs in the initial equilibrium.
Further, the comparative statics outcomes in the previous sections allow us to address the quantitative impact
of unilateral changes in trade costs and market size as well as the impact of bilateral changes in trade costs
on the optimal tariffs from the initial equilibrium.
We are also interested in addressing how the optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity quantitatively
differs from the optimal tariffs with a constant trade elasticity for given levels of trade costs and market size.
As discussed in Section 5, an implicit solution of the latter type of the optimal tariffs is given in (22) in the
heterogeneous firm model with the unbounded Pareto distribution, and (23) in the homogeneous firm model
with the degenerated distribution. While all of the optimal tariffs t∗ji depend on the domestic trade share λ̃jj ,
this share itself is a function of tariffs, which makes it difficult to solve the optimal tariffs in (21), (22) and (23)
in closed forms, as found the existing literature (e.g., Gros, 1987; Felbermayr et al. 2013). In other words,
we cannot undertake an analytical comparison of the optimal tariffs across the different trade models without
27It can be easily shown that under the bounded Pareto distribution,
V (φ∗jn) =
kφkmin







conditioning on the two sufficient statistics for welfare by Arkolakis et al. (2012). The numerical illustrations
with the calibrated parameters help us figure out this comparison without such conditioning.
In what follows, we first examine the quantitative impact of bilateral changes in trade costs on the optimal
tariffs at the symmetric situation in the initial equilibrium. To do this, we apply the analytical solutions of the
comparative statics outcomes (24) to the optimal tariffs across the different trade models (21), (22) and (23).
The impact of bilateral changes in market size on the optimal tariffs is omitted due to the reason detailed in
Section 5. We then examine the quantitative impact of unilateral changes in trade costs and market size on
the optimal tariffs, applying the analytical solutions of the comparative statics outcomes (10) and (16) to the
optimal tariffs above. In contrast to the first exercise, not only do trade costs but also market size has a crucial
impact on the optimal tariffs through changes in the wage that alter the terms-of-trade between countries.
As a result, changes in the optimal tariffs with respect to trade costs are also quantitatively different between
the first and second exercises.
6.2 Bilateral Effect on Optimal Tariffs
In this subsection, we use the short-hand notations of the key variables at the symmetric situation introduced
in Section 5. In the next subsection where a unilateral effect on the optimal tariffs is examined, we re-attach
the country subscripts to the relevant variables.
Substituting the calibrated parameters into γd, γx yields the extensive margin elasticity for the domestic
market γd = 1.85 and for the export market γx = 2.63, which in turn yields the hazard differential γd − γx =
−0.77 as well as the partial trade elasticity ε = 5.63. Further, substituting the calibrated parameters yields
α = 13.38, which in turn yields the domestic trade share λ̃ = 0.93 that is the value reported by Arkolakis et al.
(2012). Finally, plugging the calibrated values in (21) evaluated at the symmetric situation, we get optimal
tariffs t∗ = 0.166. Therefore, the optimal tariffs are 16.6 percent in trade between two symmetric countries.
This means that the optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity are much lower than those with a constant
trade elasticity found in the existing literature. For example, Felbermayr et al. (2013) report that the optimal
tariffs are 26.4 percent in the heterogeneous firm model under the unbounded Pareto distribution, while Ossa
(2014) report that the optimal tariffs are 62 percent in the homogeneous firm model. The result shows that
the variable nature of the trade elasticity lowers the magnitude of the optimal tariffs substantially. Of course,
the difference in the optimal tariff values also comes from the difference in the calibrated parameters adopted
in these papers and ours, but we find that the difference in this magnitude mainly stems from the bias that
do not control for the difference in the extensive margin elasticities γd − γx.28
Next, we examine the quantitative impact of bilateral changes in trade costs on the optimal tariffs. While
we study changes in variable trade costs from the initial equilibrium θ = 1.7 holding the other parameter values
constant here, it is possible to examine changes in fixed trade costs from the initial equilibrium fx = 0.535 (see
Appendix B.1). Consider then unilateral effects of θ on the productivity cutoffs, φ∗d, φ
∗
x. From the comparative




α+1 percent decreases in φ
∗
x respectively. Substituting α = 13.38 obtained from the calibrated values in the
initial equilibrium, we can compute changes in φ∗d and φ
∗
x induced by changes in variable trade costs from the
initial equilibrium. Using these changes in the productivity cutoffs, we can also compute changes in the key
endogenous moments ε, γd − γx, λ̃ and hence changes in the optimal tariffs t∗.
28For example, even if the calibrated parameters by Felbermayr et al. (2013) are substituted into (21), we find that the value of
the optimal tariffs is of a comparable magnitude in the baseline version. In our quantitative exercise, we mainly use the calibrated
parameters by Melitz and Redding (2015) since the domestic trade share by theirs fits well with the one observed in the US data
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Figure 2 – Unilateral e!ect of variable trade costs
Figure 2 show changes in the key endogenous variables induced by changes in ! ! [1.3, 2.1] where ! = 1.7 in
the initial equilibrium. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively display changes in the partial trade elasticity
", the hazard di!erential #d " #x, the domestic trade share $̃, and changes in optimal tari!s t!.
The partial trade elasticity is increasing in variable trade costs under the bounded Pareto distribution as
in Panel A. This trade elasticity is higher under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the unbounded
Pareto distribution (" = 4.25) or the degenerated distribution (" = 3) for any level of variable trade costs. The
hazard di!erential is decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel (b), because the extensive margin elasticity
#d (#x) is strictly increasing in %!d (%
!
x) under the bounded Pareto distribution. This stands in contrast to the
unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution in which the hazard di!erential is always zero. The domestic
trade share is increasing in variable trade costs as in Panel C, but it is lower under the bounded Pareto
distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution due to the higher trade elasticity
as in Panel A.25 Finally, the optimal tari!s are decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel D. Although the
property is well-known in the literature, this operates not only through the higher domestic trade share in
Panel C but also through the higher trade elasticity in Panel A in the current paper. Simple inspection of (20)
reveals that the negative e!ect from the lower hazard di!erential in Panel B works to increase the optimal
tari!s, but this is dominated by the positive e!ect from the higher trade elasticity and larger domestic trade
share in our quantitative exercise. Hence, changes in variable trade costs have the greater e!ect on the optimal
tari!s under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution.
Figure 3 quantitatively compares the optimal tari!s across the di!erent trade models. This comparison is
25These quantitative impacts on the key empirically observable moments are similar to those in Melitz and Redding (2015),
but the di!erence in a variable or constant trade elasticitiy has a crucial impact on evaluations of trade policy.
28
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Figure 2 show changes in the key endogenous variables induced by changes in ! ! [1.3, 2.1] where ! = 1.7 in
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x) under the bounded Pareto distribution. This stands in contrast to the
unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution in which the hazard di!erential is always zero. The domestic
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prop rty is well-known in he literature, this operates ot only th ough the higher domestic trade s are in
Panel C but also throug the higher trade elasticity i Panel A in the curr nt paper. Simple inspection of (20)
reveals that the negative e!ect from the lower hazard di!erential in Panel B works to increase the optimal
tari!s, but this is dominated by the positive e!ect from the higher trade elasticity and larger domestic trade
share in our quantitative exercise. Hence, changes in variable trade costs have the greater e!ect on the optimal
tari!s under the bound d Pareto distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution.
Figure 3 quantitatively compares the optimal tari!s across the di!erent trade models. This comparison is
25These quantitative impacts on the key empirically observable moments are similar to those in Melitz and Redding (2015),
but the di!erence in a variable or constant trade elasticitiy has a crucial impact on evaluations of trade policy.
28
Figu e 3 – Unil teral effect of variable trade costs
Figure 3 shows changes the key endogenous variables i duced by changes n θ ∈ [1.3, 2.1] w ere θ = 1.7
in the initial eq librium. Panels A, B, C nd D r sp ctively display changes n the partial trade elasticity ε,
the hazard differen ial γd − γx, the domestic trade share λ̃, and the optimal tariffs t∗.
Panel A shows that the partial trade elasticity is increasing in variable trade costs under the bounded Pareto
distribution. This ela ticity is highe und r the bounded Paret dis rib tion a under he unbounded Pareto
distribution (ε = 4.25) or degenerated distribution (ε = 3) in any level of variable trade costs. Panel B shows
that the hazard differential is decreasing in variable trade costs, as the extensive argin lasticity γd (γx) is
increasing in φ∗d (φ
∗
x) u der the bounded Pareto distribution. This stands in sharp contrast to the unbounded
Pareto or degenerate distribution in which the haz rd differential is always ze o. The domest c rade share
is increasing in variable tr de costs as in Panel C, but it is low r under th bound d Pareto distribution than
under the unbo nded Pareto or degenerated distribution d e to the higher trade elasticity as i Panel A.29
Finally, Panel D shows that the optimal tariffs are decreasing in variable trade costs. Although the property
is well-known in the l erature, this op rates not only through th higher d mestic tra e share in Panel C but
also through the higher trade elasticity in Panel A in the current paper. A simple inspection of (21) reveals
that the negative effect from the lower hazard differential in Panel B works to increase the optimal tariffs, but
this is dominated by the positive effect from the higher trade elasticity and larger domestic trade share here.
Consequently, changes in variable trade costs have the greater effect on the optimal tariffs under the bounded
Pareto distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution.
29These quantitative impacts on the three observable moments are basically the same as those in Melitz and Redding (2015),
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Figure 4 – Optimal tariffs across different trade models
Figure 4 compares the optimal tariffs across the different trade models. This comparison is made without
conditioning on the two sufficient statistics for welfare by Arkolakis et al. (2012), as Proposition 3 shows that
the optimal tariffs are always higher under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the bounded Pareto or
degenerated distribution with such conditioning. From this reason, we compare the optimal tariffs conditioning
on the domestic productivity cutoff (instead of the two sufficient statistics) in the initial equilibrium across
the different trade models.30 In Figure 3, the solid, dashed and dotted curves represent the optimal tariffs in
(21), (22) and (23) respectively. In the initial equilibrium with θ = 1.7, the optimal tariffs are 16.6 percent,
23.6 percent and 36.7 percent respectively. Thus, a variable trade elasticity leads to the lower optimal tariffs.
In our quantitive exercise, levels of the optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity are around two-thirds
(smaller than a half) of those with a constant trade elasticity in the heterogeneous (homogeneous) firm model.
Moreover, in the initial equilibrium, the difference in levels in the optimal tariffs can be mainly explained by
the difference in the trade elasticity relative to the difference in the domestic trade share.
We also compare the difference in changes in the optimal tariffs with respect to variable trade costs. From
Lemma 3, it follows that so long as there is a hazard differential (γd − γx ̸= 0), changes in variable trade costs
lead to changes not only in the domestic trade share but also in the trade elasticity. This additional channel
on the optimal tariffs need to be taken into account for assessment of trade policy in globalization, as argued
in the end of Section 5. Consider, for example, the impact of bilateral reductions in variable trade costs from
θ = 1.7 to θ = 1.3. With a variable trade elasticity, such reductions increase the optimal tariffs by 36.2 percent
(from t∗ = 0.166 to t∗ = 0.227). With a constant trade elasticity, in contrast, they increase in the optimal
tariffs by only 18.0 percent (from t∗ = 0.236 to t∗ = 0.279) in the heterogeneous firm model or 11.5 percent
(from t∗ = 0.367 to t∗ = 0.410) in the homogeneous firm model. Hence, changes in the optimal tariffs with
a variable trade elasticity are up to a factor of two (three) relative to those with a constant trade elasticity
in the heterogeneous (homogeneous) firm model. This difference reflects that changes in variable trade costs
affect the optimal tariffs through endogenous changes in the trade elasticity in (21), which is captured by that
the gap between the solid line and the other two lines is narrower, the smaller is θ in Figure 3.
30We choose fx to match the average share of firms that export in US manufacturing (χ = 0.18) under the bounded/unbounded
Pareto distributions. This yields a slightly higher value of fx under the unbounded Pareto distribution, which is needed to adjust
the difference in the upper bound of the Pareto distribution (Melitz and Redding, 2015). From the calibrated parameters, we set
φ∗x = 1.70 for (21) but φ
∗
x = 1.74 for (22) and (23), while keeping φ
∗
d = 1.16 for all cases.
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It is worth emphasizing that the difference in changes in the optimal tariffs also gives rise to the difference
in a welfare gain. While an increase in the optimal tariffs (induced by reductions in θ) negatively affects each
country’s welfare, (9) suggests that this effect is dominated by the positive effect of an aggregate productivity
gain. Hence trade liberalization always generates a welfare gain, even though it increases the optimal tariffs.
Nonetheless, the welfare gain from trade liberalization differs across the different trade models, since changes
in the optimal tariffs with respect to bilateral changes in variable trade costs are different across these models.
To see this, consider again the impact of bilateral reductions in variable trade costs from θ = 1.7 to θ = 1.3.
Plugging the calibrated values into (9), such reductions increase each country’s welfare by 3.52 percent (4.86
percent) in the heterogeneous firm model with a variable (constant) trade elasticity. This difference in welfare
changes reflects that the optimal tariffs rise by trade liberalization relatively more for a variable trade elasticity,
which reduces relative magnitude of the welfare gain from trade liberalization.31
Although we have focused on the impact of variable trade costs, the impact of tariffs is similarly analyzed.
Applying the comparative statics outcome in Proposition 1, we can examine the quantitative impact of tariffs
on the empirically observable moments in Figure 3. Applying welfare changes in (25), we can also address the
quantitative effect of tariffs on welfare.
6.3 Unilateral Effect on Optimal Tariffs
So far, we have examined the impact of bilateral changes in trade costs. In reality, however, trade liberalization
is asymmetric and often takes place in a unilateral way. As shown by Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013),
unilateral trade liberalization also gives rise to different welfare implications from bilateral trade liberalization.
Using the analytical solutions of the comparative statics in Sections 3 and 4, we readily address the quantitative
difference between these two kinds of trade liberalization. Moreover, since unilateral increases in market size
alter the relative wage, market size also has a crucial impact on the equilibrium variables. From these reasons,
we investigate the impact of unilateral changes in trade costs and market size on the optimal tariffs.
We re-attach the country subscripts to all relevant variables in the analysis below. Suppose that country i
unilaterally changes variable trade costs of importing from country j (θji). Evaluating (10) at the symmetric









Just as in bilateral effects of θ, 1 percent reductions in θji leads to
ρ(βj−ραj)




Ξ percent decreases in φ
∗
ji respectively. It is important to note, however, that unilateral effects of
θji have smaller impacts on the productivity cutoffs than bilateral effects of θ, because only country i changes
variable trade costs on imports θji, keeping country j’s variable trade costs of imports θij constant. Using
the calibrated values in the initial equilibrium, we obtain αi = αj = 13.38, βi = βj = 74.6, and Ξ = 1510 at
the symmetric situation. Substituting these values, we can compute changes in φ∗jj and φ
∗
ji from the initial
equilibrium, which are in turn used to compute changes in the key endogenous moments εji, γjj − γji, λ̃jj
and therefore changes in the optimal tariffs t∗ji in (21). All of these results are qualitatively similar with (but
quantitatively different from) Figure 3 and we relegate the corresponding figure to Appendix B.2.
31So long as the welfare gains from trade are measured by changes in the domestic productivity cutoff (9), we cannot directly
compare these gains between the heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models because that productivity cutoff is exogenous in
the latter model. Thus, we need to use changes in the domestic trade share as in (19) and (20).
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Table 1: Unilateral effect of trade costs and market size
Panel A. Variable trade costs
θji 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1
εji 5.313 5.385 5.461 5.544 5.632 5.728 5.831 5.944 6.066
γjj − γji −0.449 −0.523 −0.602 −0.686 −0.777 −0.875 −0.980 −1.094 −1.219
λ̃jj 0.819 0.858 0.888 0.912 0.930 0.944 0.955 0.964 0.971
t∗ji 0.204 0.191 0.181 0.173 0.166 0.161 0.155 0.150 0.146
∆Wj 0.0162 0.0122 0.0081 0.0040 0 −0.0040 −0.0081 −0.0122 −0.0162
∆Wi 0.0189 0.0142 0.0094 0.0047 0 −0.0047 −0.0094 −0.0142 −0.0189
Panel B. Fixed trade costs
fji 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.5 0.535 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
εji 5.465 5.550 5.552 5.599 5.632 5.647 5.697 5.750 5.804
γjj − γji −0.605 −0.649 −0.695 −0.742 −0.777 −0.792 −0.843 −0.897 −0.953
λ̃jj 0.921 0.923 0.926 0.928 0.930 0.931 0.933 0.935 0.938
t∗ji 0.174 0.172 0.170 0.168 0.166 0.166 0.164 0.162 0.160
∆Wj 0.0079 0.0058 0.0036 0.0015 0 −0.0006 −0.0028 −0.0049 −0.0071
∆Wi 0.0093 0.0067 0.0042 0.0017 0 −0.0007 −0.0032 −0.0057 −0.0082
Panel C. Market size
Lj 110 120 130 140 148 150 160 170 180
εji 5.546 5.568 5.591 5.614 5.632 5.637 5.661 5.685 5.710
γjj − γji −0.689 −0.711 −0.734 −0.758 −0.777 −0.782 −0.806 −0.831 −0.856
λ̃jj 0.925 0.927 0.928 0.929 0.930 0.930 0.931 0.932 0.934
t∗ji 0.170 0.169 0.168 0.167 0.166 0.166 0.165 0.164 0.163
∆Wj −0.0356 −0.0263 −0.0169 −0.0075 0 0.0018 0.0112 0.0206 0.0300
∆Wi −0.0039 −0.0029 −0.0018 −0.0008 0 0.0002 0.0012 0.0022 0.0033
Notes: The numbers with bold letters indicate the values in the initial equilibrium with the calibrated parameters. Market size
(Lj) is measured in units of million.
It is possible to examine unilateral effects of fixed trade costs fji or market size Lj holding other parameters
fixed. As for market size, evaluating (16) at the symmetric situation and substituting the calibrated values, we
can compute changes in the optimal tariffs in (21) by unilateral changes in Lj from the initial equilibrium. If
country j’s market size unilaterally increases from the initial equilibrium, φ∗jj falls and φ
∗
ji rises. The fact that
an increase in Lj shift these cutoffs in the same direction as an increase in θji implies that country i’s optimal
tariffs t∗ji are decreasing in country j’s market size Lj (or increasing in country i’s relative size Li/Lj), as is
well-known in the literature of the optimal tariff theory. In this sense, we can say that the qualitative impact
on the optimal tariffs is similar between θji and Lj . Interestingly, the quantitative impact is different between
these exogenous variables drastically. The same claim also applies to the qualitative/quantitative difference
between θji and fji.
Table 1 illustrates the quantitative difference in the impacts of variable trade costs θji, fixed trade costs fji
and market size Lj on the key endogenous moments of the model. Compared to unilateral changes in variable
trade costs θji in Panel A, unilateral changes in fixed trade costs fji in Panel B or those in market size Lj in
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Panel C have much limited effects on the optimal tariffs. Consider, for example, the difference in unilateral
changes in θji and Lj , which have qualitatively similar impacts on the optimal tariffs as observed above. From
the initial equilibrium, we find that 23 percent increases in θji (from θji = 1.7 to θji = 2.1) decrease country
i’s optimal tariffs by 12.3 percent (from t∗ji = 0.166 to t
∗
ji = 0.146), whereas 21 percent increases in Lj (from
Lj = 148 to Lj = 180) decrease country i’s optimal tariffs by only 1 percent (from t
∗
ji = 0.166 to t
∗
ji = 0.163).
This implies that a country with relatively larger size could benefit from setting higher tariffs on its imports
(as in the conventional optimal tariff theory), this quantitative impact is weaker than what one would expect.
Intuitively, the difference reflects that market size has no direct effect on the productivity cutoffs under CES
preferences. Comparing (11) and (17) reveals that the indirect effect through the terms-of-trade is of the same
magnitude evaluated at the symmetric situation. From this analytical result, it follows that unilateral changes
in variable trade costs have a greater impact on the equilibrium variables than those in market size, due to
the direct effect that is missing in unilateral changes in market size. Hence, the quantitative effect of market
size on the optimal tariffs is much smaller than that of variable trade costs in the current setting.
We also compare changes in welfare induced by unilateral changes in the key exogenous variables. The last
two rows in Panels A and B show that, starting from a symmetric situation, the effect of trade liberalization
is always greater in a liberalizing country than in a non-liberalizing country (Proposition 1). The quantitative
effect on welfare is quite different between variable and fixed trade costs due to the difference outlined above.
For example, 23 percent reductions in variable trade costs (from θji = 1.7 to θji = 1.3) generate a 1.6 (1.8)
percent welfare gain for a non-liberalizing (liberalizing) country;32 however, 25 percent reductions in fixed
trade costs (from fji = 0.535 to fji = 0.40) generate only a 0.5 (0.6) percent welfare gain for a non-liberalizing
(liberalizing) country. As for unilateral changes in market size, on the other hand, the last two rows in Panel
C show that, starting from a symmetric situation, the effect of market expansion is welfare-enhancing not only
for a non-expanding country but also for an expanding country, because the negative effect of market size on
declined productivity in Proposition 2 is much smaller than the positive effect of increased product variety.
For example, we find that a 21 percent increase in country j’s market size (from Lj = 148 million to Lj = 180
million) generate 3 (0.3) percent welfare gains for an expanding (non-expanding) country. In country j where
its size unilaterally increases, the model predicts two opposing effects on welfare (see (14)). In the quantitative
exercise, the negative anti-selection effect is only −0.3 percent, while the positive variety effect is 3.3 percent.
Therefore, even though market size can lead to an aggregate productivity loss, this does not predominate the
well-established benefit from increased product variety in the new trade theory literature.
The key policy implication arising from this quantitative exercise is that a country with large size would not
necessarily enjoy a large welfare gain from setting high tariffs in trade war. If this country is allowed to choose
tariffs to maximize welfare, it can benefit from tariffs by improving the terms-of-trade. At the same time, such
tariffs accelerate a welfare loss from protecting inefficient firms since a large country suffers from anti-selection
effects in the domestic market. Under the bounded Pareto distribution where the extensive margin elasticity
differential is negative, the former benefit of tariffs dominates the latter cost and hence country i’s optimal
tariffs are decreasing in country j’s market size (or increasing country i’s relative market size), as is known in
the optimal tariff theory. However, changes associated with market size have quantitatively limited impacts
on the endogenous variables, thereby leading to small changes in the optimal tariffs. The result, of course, is
partly accounted for by constant markups in CES preferences but it is also accounted by anti-selection effects
which hold in more general preferences with the endogenous wage. Thus, we hope that the finding highlights
a potential importance to reconsider existing policy implications.
32This welfare gain in bilateral trade liberalization is smaller than that in unilateral trade liberalization (3.52 percent) as seen
in the last subsection.
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7 Conclusion
This paper presents a heterogeneous firm model of trade to study optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity.
To provide a better understanding of the impact of trade liberalization and country size on optimal trade policy,
we drop the assumption of an outside good sector and employ a general productivity distribution that makes
the trade elasticity variable. Our key contribution to the trade policy literature can be broadly summarized
as follows. The optimal level of import tariffs is inversely related to the two empirically observable moments
– the domestic trade share and the trade elasticity – where the second integrant is either constant or variable
depending on the micro structure of the model. If the trade elasticity is constant and the same across markets
as assumed in previous work, the optimal level of import tariffs is the same between different trade models,
holding both the domestic trade share and trade elasticity equal. However, if the trade elasticity is variable and
differs across markets as found by empirical work, the optimal level of import tariffs tends to be under/over-
estimated due mainly to an additional channel through a variable trade elasticity. The same applies to changes
in optimal tariffs by changes in exogenous variables, and the bilateral/unilateral impacts of trade liberalization
and country size on the optimal tariffs depend critically on the micro structure that makes the trade elasticity
variable. These insights basically go through for Nash trade policies.
We also investigate the quantitative relevance of our theoretical results to help better appreciate a new role
played by a variable trade elasticity in characterizing the optimal tariffs. Using a bounded Pareto distribution
that makes the trade elasticity variable and standard parameter values from the US data in the literature, we
find that the optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity are much lower than those with a constant trade
elasticity found in the existing literature, which suggests that the variable nature of the trade elasticity lowers
the magnitude of the optimal tariffs substantially. In our calibration, the difference in this magnitude mainly
stems from the bias that do not control for the difference in the extensive margin elasticities, rather than
the difference in the calibrated parameters adopted in the previous literature and ours. Using the analytical
solutions of the comparative statics outcomes with respect to trade liberalization and country size, we also
quantitatively compare the difference in the bilateral and unilateral impacts of these competitive pressures on
the optimal tariffs with a variable trade elasticity. One of the most important policy implications arising from
this quantitative exercise is that a large country would not always enjoy a quantitatively large welfare gain
from setting high tariffs in trade war, because country size has a very limited impact on the terms-of-trade
and hence the firm-level variables under CES preferences.
Nevertheless, much remains to be done. In the theory side, the variable nature of the trade elasticity comes
only from the extensive margin which is made possible by departing from an unbounded Pareto distribution
in this paper. However, it would come also from the intensive margin that is related to the firm-level elasticity
in reality. To correctly examine the variability of the trade elasticity in trade policy evaluations, it would be
necessary to drop CES preferences with constant markups and instead employ VES preferences with variable
markups that differ across firms, in which case a variable trade elasticity would play a more important role in
optimal trade policy. There is also a gap between the theoretical and quantitative analyses. The model shows
that strategic relationships across countries’ optimal tariffs depend on the difference in the extensive margin
elasticities. To study trade policy in which tariffs are strategic complements, we need to replace a (bounded
or unbounded) Pareto distribution by another one, as this distribution induces a non-positive differential and
tariffs are always strategic substitutes. The strategic complement case can be more relevant to some real-world
problem, but we are not certain about which firm productivity distributions yield a positive differential and
whether the resulting quantitation is able to provide a good fit for aggregate and firm-level data. We leave
these theoretical and quantitative extensions and their implications for trade policy to future work.
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A Proofs
A.1 Labor Market Clearing Condition













i denote aggregate labor
used for entry and production respectively. On the one hand, the labor market clearing condition for entry








(1), (2) and the definition of Ji(φ


































, aggregate labor used for


































rin(φ)dGi(φ) is aggregate revenue (or expenditure) of goods from country i to country
n = i, j net of tariffs. The result follows from Ri =
∑
n τniRni (aggregate expenditure in country i consists
of expenditure on domestic goods in country i and imported goods from country j) and Rij = Rji (trade is
balanced between countries).
Next, we show that the labor market clearing condition is equivalent with the trade balance condition. On
the one hand, aggregate labor income in country i consists of revenues by domestic firms and exporting firms
of country i net of tariffs, wiLi =
∑
n Rin. On the other hand, aggregate expenditure in country i satisfies
Ri =
∑
n τniRni as seen above. From these, the trade balance condition, Rij = Rji, is rearranged as
Rii +Rij︸ ︷︷ ︸
wiLi
= Rii + τjiRji︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ri
− (τji − 1)Rji︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ti
.
Hence, both conditions are equivalent in the sense that they induce the same equality, Ri = wiLi + Ti.
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A.2 Welfare Expression










where the second equality follows from defining Ui ≡ Qi and PiQi ≡ Ri, and the third equality follows from
noting that Ri = µiwiLi (from the definition of the tariff multiplier µi). Further, substituting Ri = µiwiLi,

















which shows that, to know what happens to welfare as a result of unilateral trade liberalization, we just need
to see what happens to φ∗ii. Note that this real wage becomes the same as that in the standard Melitz model
without tariff revenue (µi = 1); see for example Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013). Finally, substituting
wi/Pi into above Wi establishes the result.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1

























The definition of αi in (A.1) follows from solving (5) for φ̂
∗
ij as in (7), whereas the equality in (A.1) follows
from differentiating Ji(φ









= −(σ − 1)(φ∗)−σVi(φ∗),




∗) + 1−Gi(φ∗) = (φ∗)1−σVi(φ∗).
Substituting this equality into the definition of αi gives us the result.
Next, we show several properties of αi.
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The inequality follows from φ∗ij > φ
∗
ii and noting that Vi(φ
∗) is strictly decreasing in φ∗.
• The second property is that αi = Rii/Rij . Using (1), Rij = Mei
∫ φmax
φ∗ij









The result follows from substituting (A.3) into the equality of (A.1).


























This follows from the second property and the trade balance condition.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
We first show that εij = σ− 1+ γij . Following Melitz and Redding (2015) and using the domestic trade share
















Note, in our asymmetric-country setting, that εij is defined as the elasticity of the import share relative to
the domestic share in country j. Moreover, αj = Rjj/Rji = Rjj/Rij and εij is also defined as the elasticity of
import demand relative to domestic demand net of tariffs in country j, as in Arkolakis et al. (2012) without












Since the partial trade elasticity is estimated from a gravity equation, holding national income and price index




j and wi, wj appearing in αj/τij .
To show this in our model, we follow Melitz and Redding (2015) in holding the domestic productivity cutoffs
(φ∗ii, φ
∗
jj) constant. It then follows from (8) that the wage effects are muted as ŵj = 0. Further applying (A.3)
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(γii − γij)φ̂∗ii, (A.5)
and the entry effects are muted so long as φ∗ii is held constant. Taking the partial derivative of αj/τij with






















ij from the definition of Vi(φ
∗) and ∂ lnφ∗ij/∂ ln θij = 1 from
(A.2). In a similar vein, we can show that εij is the partial trade elasticity of τij .
Next, we show that φ∗ii is a single sufficient statistic for welfare even with tariff revenue. Taking the log
and differentiating µi in Lemma 1 with respect to θji,
µ̂i = −
(τji − 1)αi
(αi + τji)(αi + 1)
α̂i.
Substituting α̂i = −[σ− 1+ γii + (σ− 1+ γij)αi]φ̂∗ii and the definitions of βi and λii in Lemmas 1 and 2 into
(9) gives us the result.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
We first show (10). From (4), (7), and (8), it follows that
B̂i + (σ − 1)φ̂∗ii = σŵi, (A.6)
B̂j + (σ − 1)φ̂∗jj = σŵj , (A.7)
B̂j + (σ − 1)φ̂∗ij = σŵi, (A.8)
B̂i + (σ − 1)φ̂∗ji = σŵj + (σ − 1)θ̂ji, (A.9)
φ̂∗ij = −αiφ̂∗ii, (A.10)
φ̂∗ji = −αjφ̂∗jj , (A.11)
ŵi − ŵj = −βiφ̂∗ii + βjφ̂∗jj . (A.12)
Note that (A.6)-(A.12) are the system of seven equations with seven unknowns where we can normalize wj = 1
and ŵj = 0 by Walras’s law. From (A.6), (A.9), (A.10), (A.12) and (A.7), (A.8), (A.11), (A.12) respectively,
(ρ+ βi)φ̂
∗
ii − (βj − ραj)φ̂∗jj = −ρθ̂ji,
−(βi − ραi)φ̂∗ii + (βj + ρ)φ̂∗jj = 0,
where
βi − ραi =
αi
αi + 1
[σ − 1− ρ+ γii + (σ − 1− ρ+ γij)αi] > 0.
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Solving for φ̂∗ii and φ̂
∗












































and, from (9), we have that dPi/dθji < 0 and dPj/dθji > 0. These differences imply that variable trade costs
have different impacts on the trade patterns through the extensive and intensive margins.
Next, we show that the impacts of fixed trade costs and tariffs are similar to those of variable trade costs.






















































Hence, reductions in any trade costs on exports and imports raise φ∗ii and φ
∗
jj , but starting from a symmetric
situation (i.e., αi = αj and βi = βj), the effect of trade liberalization is always greater in a liberalizing country
than in a non-liberalizing country. Only the difference is that reductions in import costs θji, fji, τji reduce wi,
whereas reductions in export costs θij , fij , τij raise wi.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
We first show (16). From (12) and (15),
B̂i + (σ − 1)φ̂∗ii = σŵi, (A.15)
B̂j + (σ − 1)φ̂∗jj = σŵj , (A.16)
B̂j + (σ − 1)φ̂∗ij = σŵi, (A.17)
B̂i + (σ − 1)φ̂∗ji = σŵj , (A.18)
ŵi − ŵj = −βiφ̂∗ii + βjφ̂∗jj − L̂i. (A.19)
From (A.10), (A.15), (A.18), (A.19) and (A.11), (A.16), (A.17), (A.19) respectively,
(βi + ρ)φ̂
∗
ii − (βj − ραj)φ̂∗jj = −L̂i,
−(βi − ραi)φ̂∗ii + (βj + ρ)φ̂∗jj = L̂i.
Solving for φ̂∗ii and φ̂
∗
jj and substituting them into (A.19) yields (16).
Next, we show that (14) can be expressed in terms of the domestic productivity cutoff φ∗ii only. Substituting

















(1− λii)βi − λii
βi
αi






















where the second equality comes from rewriting λii = αi/(αi + τji) in (A.4) as τjiλii = αi(1 − λii) and the







Finally, we show that starting from a symmetric situation and free trade, market expansion unambiguously




(βi − (σ − 1)ρ+ (βi − ραi)) φ̂∗ii,












































and, from (14), dPi/dLi < 0 and dPj/dLi = 0.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 3

































where the second equality follows from λii = αi/(αi + τji) and λji = τji/(αi + τji) from Lemma 1. Compared
to (9), there is an additional term that captures changes in tariff revenue raised by changes in τji. Taking the
log and differentiating (1) with respect to τji gives the counterparts to (A.6) and (A.9). Cancelling B̂i out
from these and using (7) and (8) that hold for changes in τji,
τ̂ji = −(βi + ρ)φ̂∗ii + (βj − ραj)φ̂∗jj .






(βi − ραi)φ̂∗ii +
1
ρ
λji(βj − ραj)φ̂∗jj . (A.20)
Since an increase in tariffs decreases φ∗ii and φ
∗
jj , (A.20) shows that tariffs in country i have a positive (negative)
impact on welfare in country i by increasing (decreasing) the consumption of domestic (imported) varieties.
In fact, φ̂∗ii and φ̂
∗



















Further, substituting λii/αi = λji/τji from (A.4) into the above, we obtain the expression in (18).
Next, we show that starting from a symmetric situation, country i’s gain from tariffs cannot compensate
country j’s loss. Adding Ŵi in (A.20) and Ŵj in the main text,























− (τji − 1)βj
αj + τij




where the second equality follows from using (A.4) and (A.14). Notice that the first term is positive and the
others are negative in the brackets, and thus changes in total welfare are in general ambiguous, as in changes
in country i’s welfare. However, evaluating at a symmetric situation where αi = αj , βi = βj and τij = τji,








where the value in the brackets is positive from observing that τji − 1 ≥ 0. This establishes the desired result.
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Finally, we show the derivation of (19) and (20). Taking the log and differentiating Wi with respect to τji,





To show that changes can be expressed in terms of changes in λii and µi, we use the fact that λii × µi =
αi/(αi + 1) from (A.4). Taking the log and differentiating this with respect to τji,




Solving for φ̂∗ii and substituting it into the above welfare changes gives us the expression in (19). Note that
these changes in Ŵi and λ̂ii + µ̂i hold with respect to θji and fji, and (19) also applies to variable and fixed










− αi + 1
εij(αi + 1) + γii − γij
)
µ̂i.

















εij + γii − γij
− αi(γii − γij)
(εij + γii − γij)((αi + 1)εij + γii − γij)
)
µ̂i.
Solving (A.5) for φ̂∗ii that holds for changes in τji and substituting this and βi/αi into (A.21),
λ̂ii = −
(




Substituting this into the second λ̂ii above yields the expression Ŵi in (20), which becomes the same as that
in Melitz and Redding (2015) without tariff revenue (µ̂i = 0).
A.8 Proof of Lemma 3
We first show that, if the hazard differential γjj−γji is negative (positive), the trade elasticity εji is increasing
(decreasing) in trade costs. Let ϕ ∈ {θij , θji, fij , fji, τij , τji} denote a set of trade costs between countries.
From the definition of γjn, let us re-express this as a function of the productivity cutoff φ
∗











jn) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in the productivity cutoff φ
∗
jn, the differential is negative (positive)
so long as selection into the export market is satisfied:
γ′j(φ
∗
jn) ⋛ 0 =⇒ γjj − γji ⋚ 0.
Thus, if the extensive margin elasticity γ∗jn = γj(φ
∗
jn) is a monotonic function in the productivity cutoff φ
∗
jn,
the sign of the differential is the same for a given productivity distribution Gj(φ). Exploiting the fact that
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dϕ > 0 from Proposition 1, so long as γj(φ
∗









Next, we show that, if the differential is negative (positive), the trade elasticity is decreasing (increasing) in
country i’s market size, while the converse is true for country j’s market size. Differentiating εji with respect






> 0 from Proposition 2, we get
γ′j(φ
∗










A.9 Proof of Proposition 4
We first show that, if the differential is negative (positive), reductions in trade costs have the impact on the
optimal tariffs t∗ji not only by decreasing the domestic trade share λ̃jj but also by decreasing (increasing) the









where reductions in trade costs always decrease λ̃jj irrespective of the sign of γjj − γji from Proposition 1.
Thus, it suffices to show that, if γjj − γji is negative (positive), βj/αj decreases (increases) with ϕ. From






























Using the impact of ϕ on εji in Lemma 3 and
dαj
dϕ > 0 from Proposition 1,
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Next, we show that market size has a similar impact on t∗ji. From the impact of market size on λ̃jj from
Proposition 2, it suffices to see the impact of Li, Lj on βj/αj :
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A.10 Proof of Proposition 5
We first show the impact of the key exogenous variables evaluated at the symmetric situation.
• Impact of variable trade costs: Evaluating (A.6)-(A.11) at the symmetric situation where Bi = Bj ≡ B,
φ∗ii = φ
∗
jj ≡ φ∗d, φ∗ij = φ∗ji ≡ φ∗x (and ignoring (A.12) by setting wi = wj ≡ w = 0), we get
B̂ + (σ − 1)φ̂∗d = 0,
B̂ + (σ − 1)φ̂∗x = (σ − 1)θ̂,
φ̂∗x = −αφ̂∗d.
Noting that these are the system of three equations with three unknowns (φ̂∗d, φ̂
∗






















Since φ∗d is decreasing in θ, reductions in θ decrease λ̃ irrespective of the sign of γd − γx. As for the







As φ∗x is increasing in θ, if γ(φ
∗
h) is increasing (decreasing) in φ
∗
h for h = d, x so that γd − γx < (>)0,
reductions in θ decrease (increase) ε. Together with the impact on λ̃ above, if the differential is negative
(positive and thereby increases in ε are greater than decreases in λ̃), reductions in θ shift up (down) the
f(τ) curve in Figure 2, which in turn increase (decrease) the Nash tariffs τ∗.
• Impact of fixed trade costs: The similar proof applies to reductions in fixed trade costs fx. In particular,
noting that changes in φ∗x are given by B̂ + (σ − 1)φ̂∗x = f̂x while changes in φ∗d, B are similar to those
induced by θ, changes in the three unknowns satisfy
φ̂∗d = −
1














x in the same direction as those in θ, such reductions also shift λ̃,
ε and τ∗ in the same direction.
• Impact of market size: Evaluating (A.10)-(A.11), (A.15)-(A.18) at the symmetric situation (and ignoring
(A.19) by setting wi = wj ≡ w = 0), we obtain the following solutions for the three unknowns:
φ̂∗d = φ̂
∗
x = B̂ = 0.
Thus, irrespective of the sign of γd−γx, market size have no impact on the firm-level variables φ∗d, φ∗x at
the symmetric situation due to firms’ constant markups. Since φ∗d and φ
∗
x are invariant to market size
in the symmetric situation, neither λ̃, ε or τ∗ is affected by market size as well.
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Next, we show that, if the differential is negative (positive), reductions in trade costs narrow (widen) the
gap between τ̄∗ and τ∗, while increases in market size have no impact on these bounds irrespective of the sign

















where 1− fxfd < 0 for selection into the export market. Then it follows from (A.22) that




Thus, if γ(φ∗h) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in φ
∗
h, the upper bound τ̄
∗ is stritly increasing (decreasing)















Then it follows from (A.23) that




Thus, if γ(φ∗h) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in φ
∗
h, the lower bound τ
∗ is strictly decreasing (increasing)
in θ; however, if γ(φ∗h) is constant, so is β/α and the lower bound is not affected. While fx has a similar
impact on the two bounds, L has no impact on φ∗d, φ
∗
x and hence λ̃ as well as ε as shown above, which means
that increases in L have no impact on the two bounds.
Finally, we show that bilateral reductions in tariffs always improves welfare in Nash equilibrium, as shown





(β − ρα)φ̂∗d +
1
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where the third equality follows from (A.4). The result follows from noting that φ∗d is decreasing in any trade
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Figure 2 – Unilateral e!ect of variable trade costs
Figure 2 show changes in the key endogenous variables induced by changes in ! ! [1.3, 2.1] where ! = 1.7 in
the initial equilibrium. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively display changes in the partial trade elasticity
", the hazard di!erential #d " #x, the domestic trade share $̃, and changes in optimal tari!s t!.
The partial trade elasticity is increasing in variable trade costs under the bounded Pareto distribution as
in Panel A. This trade elasticity is higher under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the unbounded
Pareto distribution (" = 4.25) or the degenerated distribution (" = 3) for any level of variable trade costs. The
hazard di!erential is decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel (b), because the extensive margin elasticity
#d (#x) is strictly increasing in %!d (%
!
x) under the bounded Pareto distribution. This stands in contrast to the
unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution in which the hazard di!erential is always zero. The domestic
trade share is increasing in variable trade costs as in Panel C, but it is lower under the bounded Pareto
distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution due to the higher trade elasticity
as in Panel A.25 Finally, the optimal tari!s are decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel D. Although the
property is well-known in the literature, this operates not only through the higher domestic trade share in
Panel C but also through the higher trade elasticity in Panel A in the current paper. Simple inspection of (20)
reveals that the negative e!ect from the lower hazard di!erential in Panel B works to increase the optimal
tari!s, but this is dominated by the positive e!ect from the higher trade elasticity and larger domestic trade
share in our quantitative exercise. Hence, changes in variable trade costs have the greater e!ect on the optimal
tari!s under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution.
Figure 3 quantitatively compares the optimal tari!s across the di!erent trade models. This comparison is
25These quantitative impacts on the key empirically observable moments are similar to those in Melitz and Redding (2015),
but the di!erence in a variable or constant trade elasticitiy has a crucial impact on evaluations of trade policy.
28
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Figure 2 – Unilateral e!ect of variable trade costs
Figure 2 show changes in the key endogenous variables induced by changes in ! ! [1.3, 2.1] where ! = 1.7 in
the initial equilibrium. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively display changes in the partial trade elasticity
", the hazard di!e ential #d " #x, the domestic trad share $̃, and change in optimal tari!s t!.
The pa tial trade elasticity is increasing in variable trade costs under the bounded Pareto distribution as
in Panel A. This trade elasticity is higher under the bounded Pareto distribution than u der the unbounded
Pareto distribution (" = 4.25) or the degenerated distribution (" = 3) for any level of variable trade costs. The
hazard di!erential is decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel (b), because the extensive margin elasticity
#d (#x) is strictly increasing in %!d (%
!
x) under the bounded Pareto distribution. This stands in contrast to the
unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution in which the hazard di!erential is always zero. The domestic
tra e share is increasi g in variable trade costs as in Panel C, but it is lower under the boun ed Pareto
distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or dege erated distribution due to the igher trade el sticity
as in Panel A.25 Finally, the optimal t i!s are ecreasing in varia le trade costs as in Panel D. Although the
prop rty is well-known in he literature, this operates ot only th ough the higher domestic trade s are in
Panel C but also throug the higher trade elasticity i Panel A in the curr nt paper. Simple inspection of (20)
reveals that the negative e!ect from the lower hazard di!erential in Panel B works to increase the optimal
tari!s, but this is dominated by the positive e!ect from the higher trade elasticity and larger domestic trade
share in our quantitative exercise. Hence, changes in variable trade costs have the greater e!ect on the optimal
tari!s under the bound d Pareto distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution.
Figure 3 quantitatively compares the optimal tari!s across the di!erent trade models. This comparison is
25These quantitative impacts on the key empirically observable moments are similar to those in Melitz and Redding (2015),



























0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
Figure B.1 – Bilateral effect of fixed tr de cos s
B Additional Qua titativ Results
B.1 Bilateral Effect on Optimal Tariffs
To compute bilater l effects of var able tr de co ts θ in Figure 3, w rely on the a alyt cal solutions in (A.24).
To compute bilateral effects of fixed tra e costs fx, we rely o the analytical solutio s in (A.25). Substituting
the calibr ted parameters, it is p ssible to examine changes in fixed trade costs from the initial equilibrium,
holding the other parameter valu s constant.
Figure B.1 displays changes in the key endoge ous v bles induced by cha ges in fx ∈ [0.35, 0.7] where
fx = 0.535 in th init al equilibrium. It is ob ious that this figure is a counterp rt to Figure 3. The comparison
between Figures 3 and B.1 reveals that fixed trade costs have qualitatively similar patterns. However, we find
that the impact of uch r d cost n the optim l tariffs is qua itatively much smaller than that of variable
trade costs. For example, 25 percent reductions in fixed trade costs (from fx = 0.535 to fx = 0.4) increase
the optimal tariffs only 2 percent. In contrast, 23 percent reductions in variable trade costs (from θ = 1.7 to
θ = 1.3) increase the optimal tariffs by 36.2 percent as seen in the main text. The intuition is clearly seen by
comparing (A.24) and (A.25): using the hat notation, bilateral changes in variable trade costs are given by
(σ − 1)θ̂ while bilateral changes in fixed trade costs are given by f̂x. Thus the impact of fixed trade costs on
the productivity cutoffs is (σ − 1) times as low as that of variable trade costs.
Next, we compare changes in the optimal tariffs with respect to bilateral changes in fixed trade costs across
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Figure B.2 – Optimal tariffs across different trade models
trade elasticity (21) are lower than the optimal tariffs with a constant trade elasticity (22) and (23) for any
range of fixed trade costs fx ∈ [0.35, 0.7]. However, the impact of fixed trade costs on the optimal tariffs are
quantitatively much smaller than that of variable trade costs in the heterogeneous firm model with a variable
or constant trade elasticity. In the homogeneous firm model, fixed trade costs have no effect on the optimal
tariffs because productivity is exogenously given.
B.2 Unilateral Effect on Optimal Tariffs
Consider unilateral effects of the key exogenous variables on the productivity cutoffs. Suppose that country i
unilaterally changes variable trade costs of imports from country j. Evaluating (10) at the symmetric situation










Similarly, evaluating the analytical solution in (A.13) at the symmetric situation and using (7), unilateral










Regarding market size, suppose that country j unilaterally expands its size. Evaluating the analytical solution










Plugging the calibrated parameters into the system of the equations, we can compute changes in the three
endogenous variables εjj , γjj − γji, λ̃jj and hence the optimal tariffs t∗ji induced by each exogenous variable.
Figure B.3 displays unilateral effects of variable trade costs in country i (θji). We can easily see that these
results are qualitatively similar with those in Figure 3, but quantitatively different from that figure because we
hold variable trade costs in country j (θij) constant. As a result, the unilateral impact of variable trade costs
on each endogenous variables is relatively smaller than the bilateral impact of such trade costs. Analytically,
comparing (A.24) and (B.1) at the symmetric situation, bilateral changes in the domestic productivity cutoff
(φ̂∗d) are greater than unilateral changes in that cutoff (φ̂
∗
jj) if and only if
ρ(αj + 1)(βj − ραj) < Ξ. (B.3)
Substituting Ξ defined in the main text, this inequality is always satisfied and hence the impacts are greater
for bilateral changes than unilateral changes for variable trade costs.
The important difference from Figure 3 is changes in the relative wage in Panel E. Since we evaluate the
initial equilibrium at the symmetric situation, bilateral reductions in variable trade costs have no impact on
the terms-of-trade (i.e., wi = wj ≡ w = 1 and hence ŵi = ŵj = ŵ = 0). In contrast, unilateral reductions in
variable trade costs do have a crucial impact on the terms-of-trade even evaluated at the symmetric situation
as indicated by (10). This is a quantitative illustration of the finding by Demidova and Rodŕıguez-Clare (2013),
and the analytical solutions of (10) in the present paper help to quantify the difference between bilateral and
unilateral changes in variable trade costs, which operates through changes in the relative wage. We find that
23 percent unilateral reductions in variable trade costs in country i (from θji = 1.7 to θji = 1.3) decrease the
relative wage of country i by 9.4 percent (from wi/wj = 1 to wi/wj = 0.906).
Figure B.4 displays unilateral effects of fixed trade costs in country i (fji). While the qualitative impacts
of unilateral changes are similar between variable and fixed trade costs as shown in (B.1) and (B.2), fixed
trade costs have much weaker quantitative impacts on the endogenous variables than variable trade costs.
Although this is not surprising from the results in Figure B.1, we also find the unilateral effects of fixed trade
costs in (B.2) are greater than bilateral effects of fixed trade costs in (A.25), which stands in sharp contrast
to variable trade costs. Comparing (A.25) and (B.2) at the symmetric situation, unilateral changes in the
domestic productivity cutoff (φ̂∗jj) are greater than bilateral changes in that cutoff (φ̂
∗
d) if and only if (B.3)
holds. Reflecting this, 25 percent reductions in fixed costs (from fji = 0.535 to fji = 0.4) leads to 3.2 percent
increases in the optimal tariffs, which is greater than the same amount of reductions in fx (2 percent) reviewed
in Section B.1. The intuition behind this result is elusive and we find it hard to explain why unilateral effects
are greater than bilateral effects for fixed trade costs.
Finally, Figure B.5 displays unilateral effects of market size in country j (Lj). Contrary to bilateral changes,
unilateral changes in market size have a crucial impact on all the endogenous variables through changes in
the terms-of-trade in Panel E.33 However, the quantitative impact of market size is very smaller than that
of variable trade costs in Figure B.3 and is approximately similar to that of fixed trade costs in Figure B.4.
We do recognize that the limited impact of market size largely relies on the restrictive feature of monopolistic
competition and CES preferences, and the same result would not necessarily hold in monopolistic competition
and VES preferences since market size works to reduce firms’ average markups (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
We expect however that the key policy result would qualitatively continue to hold in such a setting in that a
variable trade elasticity would play a more important role in optimal trade policy.
33From (16) and noting wj = 1, changes in the relative wage are given by ŵi = −
ρ2(αiαj−1)
Ξ
L̂j and the curve in Panel E is
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Figure 2 – Unilateral e!ect of variable trade costs
Figure 2 show changes in the key endogenous variables induced by changes in ! ! [1.3, 2.1] where ! = 1.7 in
the initial equilibrium. Panels (a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively display changes in the partial trade elasticity
", the hazard di!erential #d " #x, the domestic trade share $̃, and changes in optimal tari!s t!.
The partial trade elasticity is increasing in variable trade costs under the bounded Pareto distribution as
in Panel A. This trade elasticity is higher under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the unbounded
Pareto distribution (" = 4.25) or the degenerated distribution (" = 3) for any level of variable trade costs. The
hazard di!erential is decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel (b), because the extensive margin elasticity
#d (#x) is strictly increasing in %!d (%
!
x) under the bounded Pareto distribution. This stands in contrast to the
unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution in which the hazard di!erential is always zero. The domestic
trade share is increasing in variable trade costs as in Panel C, but it is lower under the bounded Pareto
distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution due to the higher trade elasticity
as in Panel A.25 Finally, the optimal tari!s are decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel D. Although the
property is well-known in the literature, this operates not only through the higher domestic trade share in
Panel C but also through the higher trade elasticity in Panel A in the current paper. Simple inspection of (20)
reveals that the negative e!ect from the lower hazard di!erential in Panel B works to increase the optimal
tari!s, but this is dominated by the positive e!ect from the higher trade elasticity and larger domestic trade
share in our quantitative exercise. Hence, changes in variable trade costs have the greater e!ect on the optimal
tari!s under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution.
Figure 3 quantitatively compares the optimal tari!s across the di!erent trade models. This comparison is
25These quantitative impacts on the key empirically observable moments are similar to those in Melitz and Redding (2015),
but the di!erence in a variable or constant trade elasticitiy has a crucial impact on evaluations of trade policy.
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Figure B.2 – Optimal tari!s across di!erent trade mo ls
quantitativ ly much smaller tha that of variable tra e costs in he heterogeneous firm model with a variable
or constant trade el sticity. In the homogeneous firm model, fixed trade costs h ve no e!ect on the optimal
tari s because produc ivity is xogenously giv n.
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Evaluating the analytical solutions in (A.13) at the symmetric situation, unilateral e!ects of fixed rade
costs on the productivity cuto!s !!jj ,!
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Figur B.3 – Unilat ral effect of var able rade costs
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Figure 2 – Unilateral e!ect of variable trade costs
Figure 2 show changes in the key endogenous variables induced by changes in ! ! [1.3, 2.1] where ! = 1.7 in
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", the hazard di!erential #d " #x, the domestic trade share $̃, and changes in optimal tari!s t!.
The partial trade elasticity is increasing in variable trade costs under the bounded Pareto distribution as
in Panel A. This trade elasticity is higher under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the unbounded
Pareto distribution (" = 4.25) or the degenerated distribution (" = 3) for any level of variable trade costs. The
hazard di!erential is decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel (b), because the extensive margin elasticity
#d (#x) is strictly increasing in %!d (%
!
x) under the bounded Pareto distribution. This stands in contrast to the
unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution in which the hazard di!erential is always zero. The domestic
trade share is increasing in variable trade costs as in Panel C, but it is lower under the bounded Pareto
distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution due to the higher trade elasticity
as in Panel A.25 Finally, the optimal tari!s are decreasing in variable trade costs as in Panel D. Although the
property is well-known in the literature, this operates not only through the higher domestic trade share in
Panel C but also through the higher trade elasticity in Panel A in the current paper. Simple inspection of (20)
reveals that the negative e!ect from the lower hazard di!erential in Panel B works to increase the optimal
tari!s, but this is dominated by the positive e!ect from the higher trade elasticity and larger domestic trade
share in our quantitative exercise. Hence, changes in variable trade costs have the greater e!ect on the optimal
tari!s under the bounded Pareto distribution than under the unbounded Pareto or degenerated distribution.
Figure 3 quantitatively compares the optimal tari!s across the di!erent trade models. This comparison is
25These quantitative impacts on the key empirically observable moments are similar to those in Melitz and Redding (2015),
but the di!erence in a variable or constant trade elasticitiy has a crucial impact on evaluations of trade policy.
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Figure B.2 – Optimal tari!s across di!erent trade mo ls
quantitativ ly much smaller tha that of variable tra e costs in he heterogeneous firm model with a variable
or constant trade el sticity. In the homogeneous firm model, fixed trade costs h ve no e!ect on the optimal
tari s because produc ivity is xogenously giv n.
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Evaluating the analytical solutions in (A.13) at the symmetric situation, unilateral e!ects of fixed rade
costs on the productivity cuto!s !!jj ,!
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Figure B.4 – Unilat ral effect of fixed trade costs
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